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We come now to a situation that tests as does no other the funda-
mental principles of the recording system. Ostensible conveyances
made by one who has never been record owner, and conveyances
ostensibly made by one who has held but has already parted with rec-
ord ownership, have already been discussed. In the present section of
this article the problem for consideration (Situation E of the six abnor-
mal situations earlier listed) is that of multiple conveyances by a record
owner while he remains such.36 3 A, who is such an owner, conveys
to B by deed that is not recorded at all, properly or improperly. A then
makes an ostensible second conveyance to C, who takes with actual or
inquiry notice of B's deed, but records. (It matters not whether in a
pure-notice or in a notice-race jurisdiction.) Then C gives a deed to D,
but only after B has recorded his deed. The question is whether a pur-
chase in good faith by D is barred by B's recording. That is, is D
thereby given record notice of B's deed, so that he must search for it
no matter how soon or how tardily it be recorded after A has parted
with the record title by the recording of C's deed? If not so, can he be
given inquiry notice by it if he accidentally discovers it or otherwise
receives information of its existence?
Since by hypothesis B's deed is recorded before D's deed is taken,
the latter can never satisfy a requirement of prior recording, and so D
must, in a notice-race jurisdiction, always fail. As earlier pointed out,
a mere decision in B's favor when the fact appears that he recorded
before D can, therefore, never in such a jurisdiction carry by implica-
tion a holding on the issue of D's good or bad faith.364  On the other
hand, a court in a notice-race jurisdiction, if it wishes to show that D
fails for two reasons, may perfectly well pass on the issue of good faith
*This article has been published in three parts. Part I appeared in (1944) 93 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 125; Part II in (1945) 93 U. OF PA. L. REv. 259. For the relation of
Part III to the preceding parts of the article see p. 259 supra. References to notes and
notecalls 1-2oi and pages 125-186 supra relate to Part I; references to notes and note-
calls 202-362 and pages 259-306 supra relate to Part II.
363. See p. 167 supra.
364. See p. 162 spra.
(39)
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explicitly. It will later appear that a majority of the decisions on this
problem have come from notice-race jurisdictions, and it must be re-
membered that such decisions, unless expressly rested on one or the
other basis (notice or prior recording) are of little value on our prob-
lem, which is solely one of notice.
It is obvious that, since B's deed is unrecorded, C is not called upon
to satisfy the condition of search; but it is equally obvious that, having
knowledge of B's deed, he cannot satisfy the equitable requisite of good
faith. The distinction between these two matters becomes important
in subsequent discussion.
The problem presented is crucial because, both deeds being given
within but one recorded outside the period of record ownership, a solu-
tion of it requires a delimitation of the field of notice and search, and
likewise requires the attribution of some definite meaning to the
phrase "chain of title." Since consideration of these issues is inescap-
able, conclusions respecting them are necessarily implicit in every deci-
sion in a "notice" (i. e. pure-notice) jurisdiction upon the problem un-
der examination. There are, however, very few discussions or even
explicit references in judicial opinions to the basic issues involved, and
those few have been of the most summary nature. To say, as every-
body agrees, that no record notice is given by, and no search required
for, instruments "outside the chain under which a purchaser or incum-
brancer claims title or lien" is helpful only to the extent of agreement
as to what is "the chain." As already indicated, in normal cases under
the recording acts there seems to be involved a simple chain of title
deeds; but, as regards search and notice, the chain may be conceived of
as one of a series of "fields" which represent the time and labor re-
quired to examine the records in successive periods of record
ownership.
In accord with the metaphor that title "descends," the normal case
can be visualized by imagining a vertical column of rectangles, one
below the other, the upper and lower sides of eich representing the
moments, respectively, of receiving and parting with title, and its area
representing, as just suggested, the labor necessary to search for deeds
of the then record owner during that period. Some quantitative con-
ception of this labor is essential. It has, however, already been made
clear that what is proposed is not a comparison of the labor actually
involved in individual cases . they vary infinitely, and the cure would
be worse than the disease.3 65 Nothing more is necessary than a com-
I
365. See p. i66 supra. The search would never, of course, be precisely the same
even for two holdings of identical duration, since the number of deeds and their indi-
vidual characteristics would vary.
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parative estimate of a search in each record period for all deeds pos-
sibly given by the then owner as against a search for all deeds possibly
given both by him and all earlier owners. The test is rather qualita-
tive than in any strict sense quantitative.306 A search of the former
type is that normally sufficient-and, seemingly, that which alone is
everywhere and always made. 367  A search of the latter type is that
theoretically required by those decisions on the problem now under
consideration which are criticized in the following pages.
If one should seek to depict, by additions to such a diagram as
above suggested, the peculiar circumstance of the instant problem, the
area of search in the record-period of each owner must be increased to
allow for the possible recording in that period of his predecessors'
deeds; and since this burden would progressively increase, the result
might be visualized as one great triangular field of search, steadily
broadening downward. The matter is perhaps better illustrated if one
imagines the original column of rectangular fields to be placed hori-
zontally and then bent into a descending stairway. The backcasing of
each step then indicates the moment of title transfer; the treads are
the successive fields of search in the restricted sense above indicated.
But when each purchaser searches for deeds given by any owner up
the stairway and recorded in the holding period of any lower owner
(outside, but within the length, of any lower tread), down to the
moment when the searcher takes his own deed, it is clear that the field
of search becomes the entire triangular space below the stairway, which
is the hypotenuse thereof.
These attempts to objectify the situation may or may not be use-
ful. Decisions in various recording situations seem to indicate an
agreement that variations in the extent of time intervals will not affect
the rigid application of an established recording principle. This is
strikingly illustrated in the general rule, statutory or judicial, that pri-
orities will be graduated by the hour and minute when instruments
are filed for recording.30 s If,.then, D must search at all for a deed from
a former record owner (A) in his chain of title that was given (to B)
before, but recorded after, the recording of another deed (to C) by
which A had seemingly first parted with title, there is no limit to the
search that must be made for such deeds; for D may be any prospec-
tive purchaser subsequent to an unrecorded deed given by any record
owner of the past. Each purchaser must search for all such deeds
366. Ibid.
367. See pp. 415, 432 infra.
368. For example, cf. Sigourney v. Lamed, io Pick. 72 (Mass. 183o); Higgins v.
Dennis, 104 Iowa 6o5, 74 N. W. 9 (1898) ; Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 55 Ati. 670
(19o3). See notes 493, 533 infra.
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possibly recorded up to the moment when he takes his own.369 It is
therefore manifest, first, that under this view nothing resembling a
"chain" of title can exist; secondly, that search by his predecessors
lessens not at all the search required of a later prospective purchaser,
but that on the contrary the burden of search covers at each title trans-
fer the entire preceding history of the title in the most literal sense,
and constantly increases. The questions are whether such a search re-
quirement is reasonable and whether it can be reconciled with "the
spirit" of the recording acts.
The problem has given rise to two lines of authority. That is, the
factual problem stated at the outset of this section has done so-not
the question just stated; if the courts that made the earliest decisions
had been conscious of that issue there could hardly have arisen a divi-
sion of opinion on the problem. The implications and effects of the
two views may be stated in general terms (though not of course in
phraseology common in the cases, for the opinions are both piecemeal
and inarticulate).
First view. (i) The subsequent "purchasers" 370 referred to by
writers on the recording acts, and sometimes so referred to in the stat-
utes, are not limited in number or time. They are all persons who take
ostensible conveyances subsequently to the giving of the prior actual
conveyance whose divestment or non-divestment is the question for de-
cision. D was such a would-be purchaser. (2) The chain of title is
that of all deeds given by successive record owners. Every such deed,
if recorded, gives record notice to all prospective purchasers. Both of
the deeds here in question, that to B and that to C (under which last
D would claim), satisfy that requirement-though notice to anybody
by C's is not here in question (and there should be no record notice,
369. Leonard Jones remarked (and the remark has been preserved down into the
8th edition of his work) that Hare and Wallace in their Notes disapproved of the New
York decisions on the instant problem "because they make it requisite to search for
conveyances from two persons during the same period." I JONES, MORTGAGES OF REAL
PROPERTY (8th ed. 1928) § 672 n. 38, (6th ed. 1904) § 54o n. 23.
It is true that Hare and Wallace used those words. Hare & Wallace, 2 WHITE &
TuDoR, LEADING CASES IN EQUITY ( 4 th Am. ed. 1877) 212. But on the same page
they indicated that search was required "against everyone who has at any time held
the estate." judge Jones also made plain through the years that "the limit of inquiry
necessary in any case," before record notice is given, "is that required by the use of
reasonable diligence." I JONES, op cit. supra (5th ed. 1894) § 58o, (6th ed. 1904) § 580.
It seems fair to assume that he never seriously considered the fact that not "two" but
an indefinite number of persons are involved, nor the conflict between the two views
stated.
370. The impropriety of the plural is obvious. There can be only one such pur-
chaser-he who acquires title by satisfying the statutory prerequisites for divestment
of the first grantee. Cf. pp. 169, i8o supra. It is, however, inveterate usage to refer
to all would-be purchasers, held barred from taking title because of non-compliance
with those prerequisites, as purchasers. Cf. notes 372 infra and 65 supra. The usage
is inexpugnable; nevertheless it seems likely that here, as in other fields of law, it
lessens the clarity with which the question is presented whether a particular claimant
shall acquire and become a purchaser.
LIMITS OF RECORD SEARCH AND NOTICE
since it is a nullity 371) ; therefore B's deed, when recorded, gives notice
to D and bars a purchase in good faith.
Second view. (I) As respects the first point above, it is fully
conceded. 372  (2) As respects the second point, the definition of title-
chain is not accepted, and the conclusion that D has record notice is
likewise rejected. It is rejected, first, on the ground repeatedly insisted
upon in the foregoing discussion 373 that "nothing should operate as
notice, which does not indicate"-or need not necessarily lead by rea-
sonable inquiry to knowledge of-"the existence of a better right than
that which the vendor [of the intending purchaser] apparently has,
and professes to be able to convey." 374 The view that D has record
notice of B's deed is rejected, secondly, on the ground that the burden
of search required under that view is unreasonable, and not to be con-
sidered as within the intent of the statutes.
3 75
An immediate consequence of adoption of the second view would
be that each prospective purchaser would search the period of record
holding by his immediate grantor for the latter's deeds, but for no
others; and he would rely upon his predecessors similarly to search
the record fields of their respective grantors. And this, in fact, is pre-
sumably all that actual purchasers do, or that professional abstractors
do for them, in any part of the country.
Before proceeding to consider authorities on the problem stated,
it is desirable to refer to two subsidiary matters. One relates to in-
quiry notice in its relations to the problem before us. The other has
to do with the circumstances that could enter into the question of D's
good faith. They have been so run together in judicial opinions and
textbooks that they cannot be completely separated.
371. See pp. 169, 177 supra. Nor should there be inquiry notice. See pp. 279, 286
et seq., 297 supra.
372. Chief Justice Dixon rightly insisted that the local statute must be literally
applied. Said he: "The operation of the statute . . . is not limited and does not
stop or cease with the first, second, third, or any specified number of first recorded
subsequent conveyances to subsequent purchasers, or from one such purchaser to an-
other, and consequently the right of the first purchaser to save himself by the recording
of his deed continues, or may continue after any number of subsequent conveyances
have been recorded; for, if the facts exist, that such subsequent purchasers, one and
all, bought either not in good faith or not for a valuable consideration, then his prior
deed will hold, and the title conveyed by it be preferred." Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443,
475 (872). However, the Chief Justice's contention that the statutory word "pur-
chaser" nust be literally applied was originally another arguable point. Many courts,
without the aid of statutes, did not read "purchaser" literally; they made it include
creditors.
373. See pp., 130-I, 260, 271, 293, 304 supra.
374. The quotation is from the notes of Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 369,
at 41.
375. The question whether search in every case should go back beyond the date of
recording to that of the execution (and presumptive delivery) of the recorded instru-
ment has already been casually mentioned. See note 172 supra. Such a requirement
is wholly logical; and also reasonable, because it is definitely limited and falls within
the period of record ownership.
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It is everywhere law today that although mala fides is a personal
disability that bars one from taking title, bona fides acts under the re-
cording acts in rem upon the title, clearing it of all incumbrances; like-
wise that although one be barred by notice from taking title for himself,
he has power by giving a deed to a bona fide grantee to divest for the
latter's benefit an earlier legal title.37  When perfect title is taken by
D it is because he is or C was a purchaser in good faith. But the state
of C's mind is as immaterial to the determination of D's good faith as
is (necessarily) that of D's in determining C's; D's rights, when he
purchases in good faith can be neither increased nor diminished by
inquiries respecting C's good or bad faith. True, D's own bad faith
might result from his receiving information (from a proper source)
that when C took his deed he had knowledge of an earlier unrecorded
deed to B, because proof of this is necessarily proof of D's own knowl-
edge or actual notice of the existence of such deed. It would, however,
be his own knowledge of that deed, or notice which would lead him to
knowledge thereof, that would bar him from taking title-if anything
could bar him.37 7  But assume that for any other reason he fails to
qualify as a purchaser in good faith, and then inquires regarding the
good or bad faith with which C acted in order to learn whether he can
be saved by the merits of his grantor. In this case the inquiry has
nothing to do with notice to D of a hostile title; it is.therefore not "in-
quiry notice" in the true sense, but merely an investigation as to safety
under an equitable principle.
In order completely to dispose of inquiry notice in the present con-
nection, assume again that D is either led by proper information to,
or accidentally discovers, B's deed. What, then, can and does he dis-
cover? Nothing else than a legal problem-that which is under exam-
ination. Once more: nothing is notice unless reasonable inquiry -must
lead from it to the fact, apparent to a reasonable purchaser, that there
exists a hostile title earlier and presumably superior to that which his
vendor offers. The posited situation is one in which, once B's deed is
discovered, notice should play no part. In earlier pages it has been
pointed out that any recourse to inquiry notice, in even the simplest
cases, either assumes that the subsequent purchaser has some knowl-
edge of law or involves treating him as though he had, and had acted
reasonably upon such knowledge. Chief Justice Dixon, in a case fre-
quently referred to herein, carried this assumption to an extreme in
applying it as follows. "Now, the reason," he said, "why the pur-
376. 3 PomEROY, EQUITABLE JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1941) § 754; PATTON, LAND
TITLES (938) § 15; 2 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 575;
2 DEvL N, REAL PROPERTY AND DEEDS (3d ed. 1911) § 747.
377. See note 4oi infra.
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chaser from C . . .is bound to take notice of B's deed, or of the fact
that the true title is or may be in B, is that such purchaser in looking
upon the statute sees that B's prior and paramount title at common
law, is not to be divested or his deed avoided, except upon the happen-
ing of three distinct events or contingencies, the absence of either of
which will save the title of B, or prove fatal to that claimed by C, or
which may be acquired by a purchaser from him ;"-namely, C's pay-
ment of value, good faith, and priority in recording.378 Now this sup-
posed "reason" is for two actual reasons obviously worthless. In the
first place it assumes, by implication, actual knowledge of B's prior and
paramount title, although the reason is offered as one for holding D
to have constructive knowledge, only, thereof; but of this 'inconsistency
-still more plainly expressed in another passage-more will be said
elsewhere. In the second place, it likewise assumes actual knowledge
of the statute, although the true question is whether we should impute
to D a knowledge of its existence, a correct understanding of it, and a
duty to act upon it. To so hold would be both a manifest absurdity and
an injustice. To be sure, the fate of the purchaser will depend upon a
court's retrospective application of the law to the situation in which the
purchaser stood. But surely he should not be held to be defeated by
his ownt bad faith because he does not know enough law to realize that
he should investigate the legal problem which that situation presented,
or because, if he made such investigation, he did not reach the conclu-
sion which the court later reaches. It may be answered that the Chief
Justice was merely explaining why no injustice is done to the subse-
quent purchaser by the rule stated (although in fact there is) ; but the
reply is that even were it necessary to excuse the law it cannot be done
by stating what a purchaser should read in the statute book, or under-
stand therefrom, or do in consequence. The only possible greater ab-
surdity would lie in suggesting that the supposed reading should "put
him on inquiry" respecting its probable consequences.
Assume, then, that B's deed has come to D's attention. Certainly
one cannot say, as in simple cases one might, that D discovers an older
deed, therefore one almost certainly superior. He sees that his vendor's
deed is junior in date but senior of record to that of B. The facts call
for prediction of judicial action; and in truth the variant decisions ren-
dered upon it might suggest to a lawyer that the problem is insoluble.
To attribute bad faith to D merely because he is confronted with such
a problem, or takes a risk in not then desisting from his intended pur-
chase, would be both fatuous and unfair. Under the fundamental prin-
ciple stated (and italicized) in the preceding paragraph notice cannot
378. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 473-4 (,872). (Italics supplied.)
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properly exist in such a situation. As regards any cause for inquiry
in addition to or beyond the legal problem in question, there cannot
possibly be any. The mere deed can put D upon no further inquiry-
in particular, as to C's good or bad faith in purchasing. Only legal
knowledge could do that; there is nothing in the deed to do it. The
situation is in that respect similar to various other matters of fact al-
ready referred to (mental competence, delivery, etc.) 379 which may
prove fatal to a purchaser but as to which nothing can put him upon
inquiry. However, it is hardly necessary to say that inquiry language
can be found in the cases.
380
Let us now continue, assuming the independence of D's and C's
good faith.
C's notice is likewise wholly independent of his recording or not re-
cording; and the two are not only independent as respects C but also as
respects any other persons whose rights C's could affect. As earlier
stated, the prior recording required of a subsequent purchaser in a
notice-race jurisdiction is merely one in addition to the requirement
of good faith; therefore independent of and incapable of affecting the
latter.3 8 1 Whether either C or D has first recorded has no more to do
with his own good or bad faith than with the good or bad faith of the
other. If C has no title, it makes no difference whether this is due to
his lack of one or the other or of both of the requisites therefor as re-
spects his power to divest B in favor of D if the latter be a bona fidd
purchaser. 3 2  If, on the other hand, D is not himself a purchaser in
good faith and must be saved if at all by the merits of his grantor as
the holder of a perfect title, it is true that C will not hold such in a
notice-race jurisdiction unless he has both recorded before B and taken
without notice of B's rights. But it must again be repeated that those
are two wholly distinct and independent facts. The question as to notice
is the same in notice-race and in pure-notice jurisdictions. In a notice-
379. See p. 264 supra.
380. For example: "The record of respondent's [B's] deed was sufficient to put
the mortgagees [D] upon inquiry as to whether Mahany [C] was a purchaser in good
faith, and for a valuable consideration." Parish v. Mahany, io S. D. 276, 285, 73 N.
W. 97, 99 (1897).
381. See pp. 161-2 supra.
382. "There is but one advantage he [C] can gain by recording his conveyance in
advance of the others [other's, B's], and that is to be able to pass a good title to one
[D] purchasing without notice of the former conveyance. And even such innocent
purchaser, in order to obtain the benefit of his position as such, must file his convey-
ance for record in advance of the filing of that of the first grantee." WADE, A TREAT-
ISE oN NovicF (2d ed. 1886) § 231a. This assumes a race jurisdiction. In a notice
state, of course the inala fide purchaser need not record in order to be able to divest the
prior non-recording grantee in fqvor of a subsequent bona fide purchaser. There would
seem to be no reason why he must do so in a race jurisdiction (for if admittedly he
had no title, how can it matter that he partly satisfies the prerequisites for gaining it?),
and there seems to be no authority for such a requirement. But of course the grantee
must satisfy the requirements of the jurisdiction involved.
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race jurisdiction the fact that C has satisfied the requirement of first
recording can neither increase no diminish the likelihood that he has
satisfied the other requirement of bona fides. However, let us recur to
the fundamental requirement as to all notice as stated in the Notes of
Hare and Wallace: "Nothing should give notice which does not indi-
cate the existence of a better right than that which the vendor appar-
ently has," and offers to the purchaser. To the words already quoted
they added this statement: "This cannot be said of a deed which,
though prior in date, is subsequent as regards the time of registry. One
who buys under these circumstances should not be affected by a latent
fact"-by which, it is understood, they referred to C's notice or lack
of notice--"which is not brought to his knowledge" 3s3-that is, either
by the deed or by information off the record. (In which last case, as
above stated, he would be merely led indirectly to the record, with no
difference in the result.)
The first of these propositions supports the view that no record
notice to a purchaser, and hence no attribution to him of bad faith, can
be based upon his mere confrontation by a recording problem. The
second supports the view that the mere recorded deed cannot put him
upon inquiry respecting anything beyond or outside that problem. The
authors were discussing cases from a notice-race jurisdiction, but the
principles applicable to the problem are not so limited; they apply every-
where save in pure-race jurisdictions (of which there are only two in
the country). Exactly the same facts might arise in a pure-notice state
-as in fact they did in one of the most important cases dealing with
our problem.3 4 If, however, in a jurisdiction of the latter type C's
deed should remain unrecorded after the recording of B's, D would, of
course, still be saved if C had taken his deed while B's was unrecorded
and without actual or inquiry notice thereof; for after B's divestment in
favor of C, the former's recorded "deed" would have no conveyancing
content, could no longer affect the title in law or equity, and could give
no record notice to D. Whether D took from C before or after B's
recording could make no difference. And, for the same reason, if in a
notice-race jurisdiction B records his deed before C's, the latter's deed
cannot, after it is recorded, give any notice to a subsequent purchaser
from B. But in none of these situations could there be anything in
383. Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 369, at 41.
384. Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. 112, 2 N. E. 929 (1885). In that case it is said:
"It was held in Connecticut v. Bradish [14 Mass. 296 (1817)], that such record--of
B's deed-"was evidence of actual notice"--thereof, by D-"but was not of itself enough
to show actual notice, and to charge the assignee of the second deed [D] with a fraud
upon the holder [B] of the first unrecorded deed." Id. at 114, 2 N. E. at 931. The
same view was expressed in Carter v. Champion, 8 Conn. *549, *556 (83), but there
was no suggestion of any presumption of such notice. See text following notecall 311
mupra.
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either party's mere deed (whether valid or a nullity, discovered inde-
pendently or as a result of information off the record, whensoever re-
corded, and in either a pure-notice or a notice-race jurisdiction) to put
D on inquiry as to anything except the legal problem that the facts
present.
We may now examine various passages from textbooks and judi-
cial opinions in the light of the preceding consideration of inquiry
notice, good faith, and the distinction between notice-race and pure-
notice jurisdictions.
Mr. Patton opens his discussion of our problem with the question
(i) "whether the record of an earlier deed [to B] from a common
grantor after the record of a deed [to C] upon which a vendor's
[C's] title is based places a purchaser [D] upon inquiry as
to whether the later grantee [C] purchased with knowledge
(2) of the earlier conveyance . . . [that is,] is a purchaser from C
on notice of any rights B may have against C? Though some
(3) courts hold that he is thus placed upon iiquiry and charged
with notice of any facts which the inquiry would reveal, other
(4) courts hold that a purchaser is under no obligation to search
the records for conveyances from any particular grantor re-
corded subsequent to that from which the purchaser's vendor
deraigns title; that any such subsequently recorded conveyance
is outside the chain of title and does not afford constructive
notice." 885
No inclusion was made in the general statement of the problem
under consideration, 8" and none is made by Mr. Patton in the above
statement of it, of any actual notice given by seeing B's deed or given
by receiving information of it off the record that could put C "on in-
quiry" in the technical sense respecting either B's rights or C's rights.
The problem is one of the effect of the recording of B's deed, solely.
The language of the foregoing quotation, and the propositions explicit
and implicit therein, are open to so many objections that it is difficult
to disentangle them sufficiently to state them clearly.
As regards question (i), the mere "record of an earlier deed"
can never have the effect of calling for any investigation unless (and
this would beg the question) it be assumed to be giving constructive
notice, and although in that case one who would avoid a bad invest-
ment must search the record he is never said to be "put upon inquiry"
by the recording.8 7 The mere recording could never call, moreover,
for the investigation of C's faith. That "inquiry" is potentially called
for in every case when a subsequent purchaser fails on his own demerits
385. PATTON, LAND TiTLES (938) § 46. (Italics supplied.)
386. See p. 391 supra.
387. See p. 264 supra.
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and might find salvation through the merits of his vendor. It has,
therefore, no particular relevance to the special problem under discus-
sion, notwithstanding that Leonard Jones and others likewise refer
to it as though it had.3 ss In fact, for three reasons it has no relevance
whatever to the problem. The first is that the issue in that problem is
whether D has constructive notice of B's deed, so that he must fail on
his own demerits; whereas the "inquiry" referred to assumes that he
so fails and must turn to his vendor's merits for relief. The second
reason is that when a purchaser is "put on inquiry," in the technical
and proper sense of that phrase, the nature and performance of the
inquiry serve as a basis for judicially determining whether he is to be
charged with, or relieved from a charge of, bad faith; whereas by the
"inquiry" here indicated the purchaser is to determine, as a fact, not
merely what was another man's past knowledge of B's deed, but also
(though the quoted passage does not so indicate) the effect of that
knowledge upon C's legal status. This last, as has been seen,38 9 is
not just to the purchaser. The third reason is implied in the second:
that the problem is one as to D's good faith, and any inquiry as to C's
is irrelevant.
As'regards question (2), this is quite correct in itself but is for
two reasons misleading in connection with (i). The first is that it
purports merely to restate the latter, whereas this related only to C's
good faith and the second question relates to D's. The second is that
"notice," in the second question, is broad enough to cover constructive
notice, to which there is no reference whatever in the first question.
In statement (3) the word "thus" carries the erroneous implica-
tion that the mere recording of B's deed can put D upon inquiry. Pre-
sumably, too, the subject of the inquiry is to be that specified under
(i) ; therefore it is totally irrelevant to the issue. Also, although D's
fate may ultimately depend, simply as a rule of law, upon C's good or
bad faith, it is preposterous to say that bad faith defeats him because
he is "charged with notice" of a legal rule with respect to a matter that
has nothing to do with his own good faith (or with the words "notice"
and "inquiry" as properly used). But if one goes outside the facts in
our problem as set and assumes that D is put on notice of B's deed by
seeing it, or by receiving such information regarding it as would truly
put him upon notice, his inquiry can lead him only to the facts of the
problem under discussion. Here again his fate will ultimately depend
on a judicial pronouncement upon that problem, but to put his failure,
388. D "is chargeable with constructive notice from such record [of B's deed], and
is put upon inquiry as to whether his grantor [C] took a good title." i JoNES, op. cit.
supra note 369, § 673 at 969.
389. See pp. 130-I, 271 supra.
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if he fails, upon his own "bad faith" unless he correctly predicts the
judgment a court will later render (for the question if settled at all, is
settled in very few states and with no more than one or two decisions
in any one) is the extremity of unreasonableness.
In statement (4) we reach the true and single issue presented in
the problem, i. e. that of constructive notice, with the practical prob-
lems of chain-of-title and limits of search therewith connected.
It is hardly necessary to say that one would not find in our best
work on the recording system, the merits of which have been several
times recognized in this article,390 such confusion of terms and theory
if judicial opiniois did not present a like confusion. Mr. Patton's
statements are a fair example of the obscurity that covers the concepts
of notice and inquiry in the reports, and a fair reflection of judicial
reasoning.
As respects the unnecessary coupling of the issue of D's good faith
with the fact of C's past good or bad faith, the explanation is that this
practice has been handed down from old cases. 391 The opinion ren-
dered in Van Rensselaer v. Clark,3 9 -2 a case decided in New York in
1836, illustrates this and other later confusions above pointed out; al-
though, as regards the coupling of the two matters specified, both were
in fact issues in that case. It is to be noted that in an earlier case,
Jackson v. Post,39 3 it had appeared that not only C but D had had actual
notice of B's earlier deed.394  On the appeal of the latter case the court
said:
"That evidence is not in this case; but enough appears to put
the subsequent purchasers upon inquiry. . . . It is a conceded
fact . . . that [C] had notice of the present plaintiff's [B's]
title. . . . It may be said, however, that the defendant had no
notice of [B's] deed except the record, and that the same record
informed him that . . . [C's] deed was first recorded, and there-
fore took precedence. 395 It is true that [C's] deed was first re-
390. See pp. 159, 277 supra.
391. In the early cases courts were still dealing with the questions whether a stat-
utory requirement of prior recording by a subsequent purchaser was a caution directed
to his own protection in the future or a prerequisite to his priority over an earlier un-
recorded conveyance; whether a prior mortgage, although recorded, must be subordi-
nated to a subsequent unconditional conveyance; what effect must be given in a race
jurisdiction to a race-statute regulating mortgages in a contest between security and
absolute conveyances; whether the assignment of a mortgage is the assignment of a
chose in action or the conveyance of an interest in land; whether creditors should be
treated as purchasers under a "subsequent purchaser" statute; whether, under a race-
statute respecting mortgages, a prior unrecorded mortgage had priority over a later
judgment docketed before recording of the mortgage; etc.
392. 17 Wend. 25 (N. Y. 1837).
393. Jackson ex d. Merrick v. Post, 9 Cow. 120 (N. Y. 1828).
394. Id. at 21.
395. In the original trial of the case, the trial court had charged to this effect-id.
at 122; the appellate court had reversed for this reason. The same view was unsuc-
cessfully urged by counseJ when the case again came before the Supreme Court after a
retrial-15 Wend. 588, 591 (1836). Cf. text at notecall 380 supra.
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corded, but it is also true that [B's] deed was recorded before
[C] conveyed the premises. The act requiring deeds to be re-
corded does not say (as the act requiring mortgages to be reg-
istered does) 3 9 1 that the deed first recorded shall have preference,
but that the unrecorded deed shall be considered void as against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser. When, therefore, the present de-
fendant [D] saw by the record that [B's] date was anterior in
date to [C's], he was bound to inquire whether [C] was a bona
fide purchaser. . . . If the defendant had made such inquiry, he
could not have failed to have ascertained that . . . [C] had in
fact"-because of his actual notice-"no title as against [B] the
present plaintiff. . . . And surely the record of [B's] deed was
sufficient to make it the duty of all subsequent purchasers to in-
quire as to the rights of [B]. The fact that his deed was re-
corded subsequent to [C's] conveyed an intimation that he in-
tended to assert his title" 39 T that is, notwithstanding its later
record, and therefore presumably under a contention that C lacked
good faith.
The single issue before the court was whether D had constructive
notice of B's deed. It is obvious, however, that the court was set upon
subordinating D by resort to inquiry notice. Record notice was dis-
posed of by simply five times assuming its existence. In the second and
fourth italicized passages it is plainly assumed; in the third, only faintly.
It is a fourth time assumed in the proposition that D was "bound to
inquire" whether C was a bona fide purchaser, which is wholly imma-
terial except on an assumption that D was not, himself, a purchaser in
good faith. Finally, it is a fifth time assumed in saying that the rec-
ord of B's deed "was sufficient to make it the duty" of D "to inquire
as to the rights of B." There was no "duty" unless the instrument was
giving constructive notice, since actual knowledge or actual notice were
alike confessedly to be taken as excluded. The idea that D "saw by
the record" B's deed is a confusion which, unfortunately, has had
pernicious repetition in later opinions and in textbooks. 3 98 If D had
constructive notice, then of course, legally speaking, he "saw" the rec-
ord, knew its content and legal effect, and ignored it at his peril. If
it was not giving constructive notice, he "saw" nothing.
There was a special reason why the court resorted to inquiry notice
in order to prevent D from succeeding-namely, that it knew, off the
record, of his actual knowledge. This reason has been lacking in later
cases where resort to inquiry notice has been a mere inexcusable eva-
396. This was changed in 1828. See note 391 supra.
397. Jackson ex d. Merrick v. Post, 15 Wend. 588, 594-5 (N. Y. 1836). (Italics
supplied.) D was in fact a subsequent purchaser at four removes from the common
grantor, A.
398. See text at notecall 556 infra.
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sion of the question whether D has constructive notice. Such cases
employ an illogical means to accomplish by indirection what the decla-
ration of constructive notice would directly accomplish. Moreover,
when inquiry notice has been relied upon in these cases-and this is
their cardinal fault-the courts have overlooked the fact that inquiry
can reveal nothing save the existence of a difficult legal problem. Jack-
son ex d. Merrick v. Post required a purchaser to predict accurately
the judicial solution of that problem although it had never been passed
upon in the jurisdiction. The court, doubtless, was hesitant to declare
outright that record notice existed. But whatever its words, the deci-
sion, given the issue, could have only that meaning. The next year,
therefore, the New York court dqclared in what is recognized as the
leading case of that jurisdiction: "In Jackson ex d. Merrick v. Post
. . . it was held that the registry of a deed is notice"-meaning, as
the text shows, constructive notice--". . . even to a purchaser stand-
ing a second or farther remove from the common source of title." The
same case held that, having such notice, the purchaser takes at the
peril of his immediate grantor's title being impeached by actual notice,
though his deed was recorded previous to the adverse one.39 Now,
in the case quoted it was contended that, contrary to the decision in
the Post case, D was outside the statutory provisions because these
related only to conveyances from the same immediate grantor, not to
remoter parties; and that, anyway, since the act under which the case
arose referred only to subsequent purchasers for value (not, like the
general registry act, to subsequent bona fide purchasers for value), no
bona fides was required of C to perfect his title, and therefore D's.
It was also contended for D that, in a notice-race jurisdiction such as
New York, C's prior recording alone gave priority over B.40 0  All
these contentions were ruled upon adversely. It thus appears that in
these old cases the issues of C's faith and of D's, and the question
whether D must perhaps ultimately rely on C's merit were all actually
before the court. But there has long been no reason to commingle
such wholly independent matters, as is still done in judicial opinions
and in textbooks.4 °1
399. Van Rensselaer v. Clark, I7 Wend. 25 (N. Y. 1837).
400. Id. at 26, 28. The arguments also involved the questions whether a distinc-
tion was to be made between actions at law (the instant case was ejectment) and suits
in equity, the doctrine of notice being confined to the latter, and whether even in equity
anything less than actual fraud could prejudice a subsequent purchaser. Ibid.
4oi. Hare and Wallace say, for example: "A purchaser with actual or construe-
tive notice [D] cannot stand on the validity of the title as deduced of record if the
vendor [C] bought with notice, although this was unknown to the purchaser, and he had
every reason to rely on the good faith of his immediate vendor [C]. It has been held
to follow that if the same premises are conveyed successively to different persons, and
the first conveyance is registered, although not until after the registration of the sec-
ond, a subsequent purchaser from the second grantee will run the risk of his good
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Judge Cowen remarked in his opinion in Van Rensselaer v. Clark,
supra: "But it is said that [D] bought of [C] on the faith of finding
that his deed was first recorded, and that he shall not be holden to look
farther, and run the hazard of actual notice to [C]." 402 Such an
argument might well, at that early day, have rested on more than one
idea.403 It seems most likely, in view of the doubt whether prior
recording alone sufficed in a notice-race jurisdiction to give priority,
that the underlying idea was that expressed in the passage above
quoted from Hare and Wallace respecting notice to D of B's record in
such a jurisdiction.40 4  It has, however, also been pointed out that the
view those writers expressed is equally sound as respects pure-notice
jurisdictions. It is based on the limitation of a purchaser's chain of
title, and of the consequent necessity of search.
In preceding pages an attempt has been made to clarify the re-
quirements of good faith in D by disentangling them from irrelevant
matters with which they happened to be coupled in early cases. As a
last example of these perplexities it seems well to discuss here a Ver-
mont case of 1853 405 which is difficult to interpret because of the
obscurity of the opinion but which under no acceptable interpretation
seems in fact to be relevant to the problem under discussion, although
always cited as pertinent.
In this case A, after giving to B a mortgage that was not promptly
recorded, made an ostensibly absolute conveyance to C, who had knowl-
edge of the mortgage and could therefore take only the equity of re-
demption, and who himself gave back purchase money notes and a
mortgage. These instruments were recorded, and thereafter the B
mortgage likewise. C's notes and mortgage were later assigned by A
to X, and still later C quitclaimed "the premises" to D. The court held
faith, and inay be postponed by proof that he knew or ought to have known of the
pror grant." Hare and Wallace, Ioc. cit. supra note 369 at 40. (Italics supplied.)
Now, of course, the second proposition does not follow consequentially from the first.
They both illustrate the principle that if D fails on his own merits he may still be
saved by C if the latter was a bona fide purchaser, and will otherwise be lost. But the
failure of D on his own merits, which in the first proposition is explicitly stated, is in
the second simply assumed. The question in that situation is whether B's recording
(actual notice by D being admittedly absent) does bar bona fides in D. Cf. text at
notecall 370 stpra.
402. 17 Wend. 25, 3X (N. Y. 1837).
403. Particularly (aside from that stated in the text) the idea might have been
that since C had done all that the statute required in the matter of search (although
in fact nothing, B's deed being unrecorded), and since his mala fides was a purely per-
sonal disability, his record title should be treated as perfect As a matter of recording
policy the view would have had merit, but it was too late for its recognition; C had
notice, was not a bona fide purchaser, and the view suggested would have made him,
substantially, precisely that
404. See pp. 396, 399 .epra. Cf. Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 406, 418 (i82o) (a pure
notice jurisdiction) ; Clark v. Sawyer, 48 Cal. 133, 142 (1874) (a notice-race jurisdic-
tion) ; comments on Day v. Clark, 25 Vt 397, 403-4 (1853), as to which see text just
below, in Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 523, 530 (1866) (a notice-race jurisdiction).
405. Day v. Clark, 25 Vt. 397 (1853).
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that D took clear of the B mortgage. The reasons were stated as
follows:
(I) "Unless [D] is to be affected with notice, he has a para-
mount title"-a title paramount-"to the [B] mortgage,
(2) and we do not see that he can be. When the [B] deed
was recorded, it is true, that was notice to all subsequent
(3) claimants, that there was such a mortgage; but the record of
that mortgage was no notice to [D], that when [C] bought
of [A],'they 406 had notice of the [B] mortgage; and without
such notice [to D], the title to [D] derived from [C] must
override the [B] mortgage.
(4) "It has long been settled, that if a fraudulent conveyance
is made,"-here, by A to C-"and the fraudulent grantee [C]
conveys to a bona fide purchaser, without notice,"-that is,
one who aside from the record is admittedly such-"his grantee
(5) takes a valid title; and if the grantee [the original grantee, C],
has notice, at the time he purchases, of an outstanding unre-
corded deed [to B], it will not do to affect his grantee [D]
with such notice, unless he [D] knew that his grantor [C] had
such notice at the time he [C] purchased. Unless this is shown,
he [D] has a right to rely on the legal title ...
(6) "Those who took title under the mortgage from [A] must
have been apprised that he [A] knew of the unrecorded deed
to [B], when he took the mortgage from [C], as he [A] was
the person who executed it. But this does not apply to the
title derived by the conveyance of their [C's] equity of
redemption." 407
No one can be certain, perhaps, regarding the meaning of what
is so.very poorly expressed. It seems clear, however, that all the
propositions should be taken together, and so constrtied as to give a
consistent meaning, if possible, to all. Some writers, taking proposi-
tions (2) and (3) together, and alone, have caustically criticized the
court's reasoning-justly enough on that basis. 40  But they should
not be so taken. It seems fairly clear that the court meant proposition
(i) literally, i. e. that D had no notice of any kind. The claimants
406. The actual names of the parties were as follows: of A, Adam Kimball; of B,
the Peaslee heirs; of C, Adam and Theron Miles; of D, Gale; of X, Luther and Allen
Martin, and John Kimball.
407. Id. at 403-4. The C-A notes and mortgages are not referred to in the text.
D later conveyed to Clark, who also acquired X's rights under the C-A notes and
mortgage, and likewise the notes of A in favor of B, and indorsed by Day, which were
secured by the A-B mortgage. It was held that Clark could stand on D's title, to
which the discussion in the text is therefore confined. Hence, Clark having recovered
judgment against Day on the A-B notes, it was held that the latter could not maintain
a bill to secure an injunction against enforcement of the judgment and an order applying
the mortgaged property to the payment of those notes.
4o8. I JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 369 (2d ed. 1879) § 575 n. i, (5th ed. 1894) § 540
n. 5, (6th ed. 1904) § 54o n. 23, (8th ed. 1928) § 672 n. 38. Woods v. Garnett, 72
Miss. 78, 86, 16 So. 390, 392 (1894). TIFFANY, op. cit. snpra note 376, at 2193 n. 74
(Ist ed. 1912) §45 n. 77; PAT'ToN, LAND TrrL-s (1938) §646 n. 8o.
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referred to under proposition (2) were not grantees by ostensibly abso-
lute conveyances, but transferees of the A-B mortgage, bound, as as-
signees of a chose in action, by- equities existing against their
assignor, A.409 D, then, was without notice under that rule of B's
rights-. Besides, he had no information, received either directly or,
as stated in propositions (3) and (5), through knowledge that C's
title was invalidated by knowledge of some prior right, that put him
upon inquiry as to B's claim. (Moreover, it has been shown above
that, even if put "on inquiry," he could be led only to a problem, non-
solution of which should not constitute bad faith, so that inquiry notice
cannot with sense or justice be involved.) 410 The only other possibil-
ity would be constructive notice by the recording of B's deed. If the
language of proposition (2) be interpreted as here suggested, there is
no explicit statement on that point, but such notice would be impliedly
denied by the language of propositions (3) and (5), which merely deny
other notice by such recording. This seems to be the true meaning of
the case in its relation to our problem.
411
We may now consider the views of text-writers and certain judi-
cial pronouncements on the problem under examination.
The second view 412 was explicitly approved by Hare and Wallace
as preferable to the first.4 13 Justice Story cited the early Massachu-
setts cases supporting the second view as illustrations of the rule that
a wala fide purchaser can pass perfect title to a bona fide purchaser,
thus possibly implying approval of the holding that D takes in good
faith, but not discussing that question.4 14 Mr. Devlin did the same-
in no other way dealing with or recognizing the problem.41 -  Leonard
Jones, in his Mortgages, ultimately, somewhat more clearly implied in
a like manner the same preference,416 although his later editors have
409. 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 376, § 733.
410. See pp. 13o-I, 270-I, 397-8, 403 s=pra
411. Mr. Patton, however, explains it otherwise, believing that it rests "not on the
ground that the purchaser himself [D] is without notice of earlier deed, but because he
claims through a grantor who could have had no constructive notice from the records
and as to whom there is no presumption that he had other notice." PAxroN, LAND
TITLES (1938) § 46 n. 8o. If this were the true explanation of the case it would have
nothing to do with our problem; and the decision in basing D's rights to claim through
a bona fide purchaser depends upon D's knowledge of C's bad faith, and not upon the
actual facts as to C's good or bad faith, would be at variance with all other authority
on that point. The explanation is a possible one. It seems to be the interpretation
adopted by Judge Downer in the opinion in Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 523, 530 (I866).
412. See p. 155 supra.
413. Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 369, at 40-2, 212-3.
414. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON Egurr JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1846) § 434.
415. 2 DEv wN, op. cit. supra note 376, § 746.
416. I JONES, op. cit. siepra note 369 (6th ed. 1904) § 559. In earlier editions his
views had apparently fluctuated. In the second edition (1879) § 574, he stated the
recording problem and gave the first-view solution, relying on Chief Justice Shaw's
argument discussed in the text at pp. 412-3 infra. In the fifth edition (z9o4) § 540,
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shifted to acceptance of the first view; 417 and in his Real Property he
definitely stated as law the second view, basing his opinion on the defi-
nition of a chain of title as excluding the first deed.418
Professor Washburn long ago stated the first view 419 as the rule
of American law. 420 Shortly thereafter', Mr. Pomeroy stated (his words
have stood unchanged since 1882) that the law was so "settled by an
overwhelming weight of authority." 42" An examination of the cases
will show that this pronouncement is a very great exaggeration. He
conceded the existence of early decisions supporting the contrary view,
but these, he said, "have been overruled in the same states in which
they were given." 422 They have been questioned, even, in only one
such state, Massachusetts; and although Mr. Pomeroy merely erred,
with others, in construing an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw as over-
ruling certain decisions of that state, despite his explicit statement to
the contrary,42 3 its Supreme Court has pointed out that his words were
only dictum, and has added fiodern support to the early decisions.
424
Mr. Pomeroy's grounds for preferring the first view were even weaker
than his citations of authority. He gave only two, which we must as-
sume to be the best he could draw from the cases or from reason. "It
is plain," he wrote, "that C got no title by his first recording, because
he had actual notice. When C conveyed to D, if B's deed had not been
on record, and D had put his own deed on record before B's deed was
recorded, D would have obtained the title. But the record of B's deed
he merely cited the cases as pertinent to the proposition that the right of the first
grantee to save his title by recording "continues after any number of conveyances in
the same chain of title," and until some one "in the chain of title under the second con-
veyance purchases in good faith and places his deed on record." (Italics supplied.)
The questions whether the first deed is in the chain of title and whether the second
purchaser is in good faith are ignored. The placing of the second purchaser's deed on
record is not required in a notice jurisdiction, such as Judge Jones' state. In the sixth
edition (1904) § 559, he treated the cases exactly as did Story in 1846, but he also, in
§ 541, repudiated Judge Shaw's views of search, so that his net opinion was clearly
indorsement of the second view of our Droblem.
417. 1 JONES, op. cit. supra note 369, § 673 at 969.
418. JONES, REAL PROPERTY IN MODERN CONVEYANCING (1896) §§ 1502-4.
419. See p. 394 sup ra.
420. 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (Ist ed. 1862) § 595, preserved through 3 id.
(5th ed. 1887) 327, 36o. He also stated the problem as one necessarily of a race
jurisdiction.
421. 3 POmEROY, op. cit. supra note 376, at 77.
422. Ibid.
423. The same assumption is implicit in Professor Washburn's statements cited in
note 42o supra. Various other writers and judges have implied or stated the same.
What the Chief Justice said was this: "Believing that this case may be decided . . .
upon another and distinct ground, not impugning the authority of the cases cited"-
that is, of the earlier Massachusetts cases--"we have preferred that course; the more
so, as we are of opinion, that should the point, for which the above cases are cited as
authority, be presented for direct adjudication, it is one of great importance, deeply
affecting the law touching titles to real estate, deserving therefore of great considera-
tion; and that such a rule of constriiction ought not to be drawn in question, without
the fullest consideration of all the arguments bearing on the question." Flynt v. Ar-
nold, 43 Mass. 61g, 626 (1841).
424. See p. 434 infra.
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prior to the conveyance to D cut off the latter's precedence, because D
could claim nothing from C's first record, by reason of C's having
actual notice." 425 Nota bene, that although the leading cases were
from a pure-notice and a notice-race jurisdiction (Massachusetts and
New York, respectively) Mr. Pomeroy, writing in a notice-race juris-
diction, and, as has been seen, seemingly oblivious to that distinction, 426
states the problem as though one of a notice-race jurisdiction only.
(However, in doing so, he only followed others, some of them writing
in pure-notice jurisdictions.) 427 The issue being whether the recording
of B's deed prevents D from acquiring priority as a purchaser in good
faith, Mr. Pomeroy first merely begs the question at issue-D had no
priority because the recording of B's deed precluded it; and then at-
tempts to make this better than a mere assumption by offering a rea-
son which is an extraordinary non sequitur: that B's record gave D
constructive notice because for another reason he could not get title-
namely, because his grantor, C, had also taken with notice. This slip
was due, of course, to a careless restatement of holdings in old cases
from a notice-race jurisdiction, above discussed, where a prior record-
ing created a seeming "precedence," and in which the court decided
both the point of D's notice from B's record and the point that he was
then irretrievably lost if his grantor was not a bona fide purchaser. 42s
Mr. Tiffany likewise states that D "has usually been regarded" as de-
feated by B's record.
4 29
It happens that the New England states, in which the second view
was first adopted, are pure-notice jurisdictions; and also that New
York, in which the second view originated, is a notice-race jurisdic-
tion, and that a decided majority of the states following that view are
jurisdictions of the latter type. But this distinction between pure-notice
and notice-race jurisdictions has, as repeatedly stated, nothing to do
with the problem of notice, the prior recording by the subsequent pur-
chaser being merely a prerequisite added to the requirement that he
be without notice.4 30 Chief Justice Dixon, in the first of his opinions
in Fallass v. Pierce, supra, said, indeed, that "The question, whether a
purchaser from a secoftd grantee, whose deed was first recorded, is
425. 3 PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 376, § 76o.
426. Mr. Pomeroy wrote in California. See text following notecall 107 supra.
427. Judge Jones had earlier stated the problem in the same way. i JoNES, op.
cit. supra note 369 (2d ed. 1879) § 575, and it so remained in later editions: (5th ed.
1894) § 540, (6th ed. 1904) § 559. Mr. Wade had not mentioned the problem in his
first edition of I878 (seemingly written in Missouri), but stated it as Jones and Pom-
eroy did in his second edition of I886 (seemingly written in California). WADE, A
TREATISE O N NOTICE (2d ed. i886) § 231a. See p. 16o supra.
428. See text at and following notecall 391 supra.
429. 2 TIrrANY, op. cit. supra note 376, at 2192; unchanged in the third edition of
1939.
430. See pp. x61-2 supra.
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bound to take notice of the record of a prior deed from the same grantor
to another person, subsequently recorded, and before the time of such
purchase, is one obviously depending upon the phraseology and proper
construction of the statute law requiring deeds and other conveyances
of land to be recorded, and declaring the effect of the omission, when
the same are not recorded." 431 This "obvious" dependence is ex-
plained in four pages, but the remarks have no connection whatever
with the question of record notice. They show, merely, that under a
notice-race statute a would-be purchaser (D) must record' his deed
before B's is recorded, as well as be ignorant of B's deed when he
records, in order to divest B of title. And therefore, in such a state,
since in our problem D by hypothesis records last, he must lose regard-
less of the question of notice. As for that question, the Chief Justice
merely quoted from Chief Justice Shaw a passage in which the ex-
istence of notice to D is assumed; but he knew that the Massachusetts
court, in that case, although plainly inclined so to hold, explicitly ab-
stained from deciding the'case on that point, as has been above pointed
out. 43 2 Moreover, Chief Justice Dixon's own opinion equally avoided a
forthright decision of the point, for he said: "D, even supposing B's deed
on record was not constructive notice, which I cannot believe to be law
under our statute, . . . fails entirely to show compliance with the
[statute's] other condition, to-wit, that his deed was [be] first duly
recorded. A compliance with the first . . . is wholly unavailing un-
less it is at the same time shown that the other has been likewise
observed. . . ." 43 And in his second and final opinion in the case,
although assuming in one passage 434 a holding that B's record would
give constructive notice and giving for this view a reason the merit
of which will next be considered, the point was disposed of without
emphasis and almost by indirection, presumably because its decision
could not affect the outcome of the case.
43
5
The reasons given by Chief Justice Dixon for holding B's record
to give D constructive notice were two: "Now, the reason why the
purchaser from C . . . who buys after the recording of the prior deed
to B from A . . . is bound to take notice of B's deed, is that"-stat-'
43. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 456, 458 (1872).
432. Flynt v. Arnold, 43 Mass. 61g, 621-2, 626 (1841), and see note 423 supra.
433. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 459 (1872). (Italics supplied.) Mr. Patton
correctly states this as the basis of the decisiom'of the Wisconsin court. PATTON, LAND
TITLEs (1938) § 46 n. 8o. Despite the long and unanswerable argument of the court,
Mr. Tiffany goes no further than to say that "it seems that the last purchaser might
• . . be postponed" if he had not also first recorded, though purchasing before the rec-
ord of B's deed. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 376, at 2192 n. 72. It would undoubt-
edly be postponed. Cf. id. (3d ed. 1939) 2192 n. 72; PATTON, LAND TITLrEs (1938)
§ 13 at notecall 159 and citations.
434. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 472 (1872).
435. Id. at 473.
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ing the first reason, already discussed,4 36 and then proceeding with the
second: "The purchaser from C, looking upon the record, sees, first,
the prior conveyance from A to B, and, second, the first recording of
C's deed. Of these two facts the record informs him." 437 This passage
was relied upon in an opinion by the Supreme Court of South Dakota
on the problem under discussion. 438  It has repeatedly been quoted as
though it were enlightening, but obviously it merely begs the question.
D might in fact see B's deed, but then the problem would be one of
actual knowledge. As proposed for discussion, the question is solely
one of constructive notice; in other words, whether D shall be treated
as if he had seen the record. In such case he "sees" nothing unless the
record is for other reasons held to be giving him constructive notice.
It seems clear that a choice between the two solutions of the prob-
lem must rest on the opinion held respecting the search that can rea-
sonably be imposed upon subsequent purchasers. Mr. Tiffany com-
mented upon the problem thus, after stating the first view:
"Under the doctrine stated . . . an intending purchaser, al-
though he finds . . . that a particular person in the chain of title
executed a conveyance of the land,"-that is, one consistent with
the title offered him-"must nevertheless continue the examina-
tion of the records under the name of such person, in order to
see whether there was subsequently recorded a prior conveyance
by such person [made while record owner] though . . . he is
under no such duty for the purpose of seeing whether there was
subsequently recorded a subsequent conveyance by such person.
If, however, he performs his duty in searching for any prior con-
veyance, he would usually discover any subsequent conveyance of
record, and for this reason there seems a certain inconsistency in
making the question of his constructive notice of a conveyance sub-
sequently recorded depend upon the date of the conveyance." '31
As for any "inconsistency" in making search depend upon dates of
conveyances and dates of recording, that is impossible, for such, as
already remarked, is the very basis of the recording system. As for
the rest of the last sentence quoted, it defies understanding. The "duty"
referred to is clearly one of making some search less than that required
by the first view of our problem, for Mr. Tiffany was criticizing that
view; moreover, under it the searcher would not merely "usually" but
always necessarily discover all deeds of earlier owners, whensoever re-
corded. On the other hand, the search in mind was something more
than that required by the second view of our problem; for under that
436. See pp. 396-7 supra.
437. Fallass v. Pierce, 3o Wis. 443, 474 (1872).
438. Parrish v. Mahany, IO S. D. 276, 73 N. W. 97 (1897) ; see p. 427 infra.
439. 2 TIFFANY, op. Ci. supra note 376, at 2192-3.
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no deeds of earlier owners, recorded in the holding periods of later
owners, would be discovered. What, then, was the "duty" referred
to? The inescapable conclusion is that Mr. Tiffany had nothing defi-
nite in mind.
Of course, any burden can be imposed upon a prospective pur-
chaser if a court is willing to do so. The Massachusetts court, in its
earliest decision upholding the second view, remarked: "When a pur-
chaser is examining his title in the registry of deeds, and finds a good
conveyance to his grantor, he is not expected to look further. This
case, it is true, presents the question in a very strong point of view for
the demandants; as [D] had only to look to the registry for the
next day, and perhaps only to the next page, to discover this prior con-
veyance to the demandants. But if he is required to look one day, or
one page, beyond that which exhibits the title of his grantor, it will be
impossible to say where the inquiry shall stop." 44o It is true that
Chief Justice Shaw, commenting on the case just quoted and other
early Massachusetts decisions, said in Flynt v. Arnold: 441
"Were it not for the cases . . .mentioned, we should have
been strongly inclined to the opinion, that . . . before [D] took
his deed of [C] . . . the mortgage from [A] to [B] was on
record, and he might by ordinary inquiry have discovered it; and
that this would constitute constructive notice to him of the ex-
istence of that incumbrance. . . . D could not hold against B;
not in right of C because, in consequence of actual knowledge
of the prior deed, C had but a voidable title; and not in his own
right, because before he took his deed, B's deed was on record,
and was constructive notice to him of the prior conveyance to B
from A under whom his title is derived. . . . [The contrary view]
is founded wholly on the suggestion, for which no reason is as-
signed,"-which is a statement wholly inaccurate-"that when a
purchaser is examining a title in the registry of deeds, and finds a
conveyance to his grantor, he is not expected to look further ...
If an ordinary diligent search would bring the inquirer to a knowl-
edge of a prior incumbrance or alienation, then he is presumed
to know it. . . . It would seem that a search, so far as to ascer-
tain whether any former proprietor, whilst he had the estate, had
aliened or incumbered it, would be necessary, in order to render
the public registry available to the full extent to which it was
designed by law; and therefore it would be reasonable to presume
in each case, that such search had been made, and if any such deed
from a proprietor was on record, that it had been discovered and
was known to the subsequent purchaser." 442
44o. Connecticut v. Bradish, 14 Mass. 296, 303 (1817).
441. 43 Mass. 61g, 621-5 (184I).
442. Id. at 621-5.
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These remarks of the very eminent judge were in due time dismissed
as mere dicta when the problem again received from his successors
that "fullest consideration of all the arguments bearing on the ques-
tion" which, as he said, it merited, 443 and the views of the older cases
criticized by him were fully approved. In its latest pronouncement on
the question the Massachusetts court remarked:
"The reasons upon which the earlier cases were decided seem
to us the more satisfactory, because they best follow the spirit of
our registry laws and the practice of the profession under them.
It would be a hardship to require an examiner to follow in the
indexes of grantors the names of every person who, at any time,
through perhaps a long chain of title, was the owner of the land.
"We do not think this is the practical construction which
lawyers and conveyancers have given to our registry laws. The
inconvenience of such a construction would be much greater than
would be the inconvenience of requiring a person, who has
neglected to record his prior deed for a time, to record it, and to
bring a bill in equity to set aside the subsequent deed, if it was
taken in fraud of his rights." 444
The remarks of Chief Justice Shaw were doubtless the basis for
Chief Justice Dixon's dogmatic pronunciamento, already quoted, "that
every consideration of the subject, and construction of the statute,
founded upon the convenience, or inconvenience, real or supposed, of
searching the records in the manner in which they are kept or indexed,
is wholly impertinent, and therefore deceptive and liable to lead to
error." 445 What the two quotations, taken together, show is this:
That Chief Justice Dixon, because he scorned even to consider the
reasonableness of search, merely assumed that any recorded deed must
give notice to all subsequent purchasers; and that Chief Justice Shaw
did not assume notice, since he explicitly made the presence of that
dependent on the reasonableness of search, but did assume (what is in
substance the same) that any search is reasonable, since certainly none
can be greater than the one here involved, of searching every period
of record holding under the name of every prior record owner.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has fully accepted the above
views. It expressed as follows its reasons for approving the New York
rule:
"We think the Massachusetts decisions are erroneous, be-
cause they hold that one not bound by the registry law is protected
443. See note 423 supra.
444. Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. 112, 113-5, 2 N. E. 929, 930-I (1885).
445. See p. xo4 supra.
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by it. But for the registry law, where one has conveyed his legal
title, he has nothing left to convey to another, and that other, with
or without notice of the prior conveyance would get nothing, for
his grantor had nothing to convey. Now, the statute comes and
provides that, though a conveyance of the class named in the
statute may be made, it shall as to certain persons, viz., creditors
and purchasers without notice, be valid only from a certain time,
viz., the time when it is filed for record. . . . But when filed for
record it has full scope and effect against the world. . . . It is
no answer to say that it is inconvenient to the purchaser to ex-
amine a long and voluminous record, made after the record of
the title of his grantor. To this the sufficient reply is that, but
for the registry acts, he would not have even the protection which
such records afford. . . . It seems clear to us that one who
buys an estate cannot invoke the protection of the registry act as
against a deed recorded under such act at the time of his pur-
chase." 446
It is a startling proposition that when a subsequent purchaser "invokes
the protection of the registry act," decisions that give him priority
"hold that one not bound by the registry law is protected by it." Were
this so, the subsequent purchaser who is the declared beneficiary of
the recording acts could never secure the benefits they grant him. The
law binds everybody. True, a subsequent purchaser cannot at one
moment be "bound" as the losing and "protected" as the winning liti-
gant. But if "protected," under the circumstances of our problem,
against the holder of a seniQr deed, he may subsequently be held
"bound" under like circumstances against the holder of a junior deed.
The court speaks of the statute as though it automatically solves the
problem, although it says nothing of search, nor, explicitly, of notice
in such a case. In various other situations the Mississippi court, like
all others, gives meaning to the statute by defining the operation of
search and notice. In the present problem the Court merely refused
to do so.
The simple fact is-as already remarked, and as the Massachusetts
court intimated 447 -that the search required by the first view is not
that recognized by lawyers and abstractors as requisite. It is judicial
theory, remote from practice. Mr. Patton concedes that it "may be"
true, as the Massachusetts court asserts, that its view is more con-
sistent than the New York view with the spirit of the recording acts.448
To concede this as respects pure-notice states, such as Massachusetts,
is necessarily to concede it equally as respects notice-race jurisdictions
446. Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 86-7, 16 So. 390, 392 (1894).
447. See text at notecall 367, following notecall 375 supra, and pp. 433-4 infra.
448. PATTON, LAND TITLES (1938) § 46 n. 8o.
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such as New York. It is true, as he points out, that courts in states
of the latter type "cannot decide the question upon the equitable
features of notice or consideration alone, but [only, also] upon the
strictly statutory requirement that the [subsequent] purchaser secure
priority of record." 449 But he also refers to the final opinion in Fallass
v. Pierce as concluding "that the New York rule is correct for all states
whose recording act limits its protection to those purchasers 'whose
conveyance is first duly recorded.' "4C0 The Wisconsin case did not so
state. Had it done so it would have been a gross confusion. The
decision, in the sense of a judgment for B as against D, is indeed in-
evitably correct in notice-race jurisdictions since by hypothesis B first
records. But a decision in such a jurisdiction on the issue of notice has
nothing to do with the other requirement, and its acceptability or non-
acceptability must rest on tests applicable equally to notice and to
notice-race jurisdictions.
As regards the practice of the profession, the authors of a recent
work on New York law dismiss with the following curt remark the
cases which in that state established the first view of the problem in
hand: "The principle of these cases is absurd, because it would necessi-
tate a search to date against every name in the chain of title. This is
never done. Search is only made against each name, from the day
before the date of the deed into him, to the day after the record of the
deed out of him." 4"1 As already said this is believed to be true through-
out the United States. A legal construction of the recording acts that
is utterly inconsistent with the practice of title examiners is, literally,
nothing but a snare for the intending purchaser who is the intended
favorite of those statutes.
We will now consider the case authority cited by Mr. Pomeroy,
Judge Jones, Mr. Tiffany, Mr. Patton, and by their latest editors,4 2 for
the two views discussed above as matters of principle. In doing this,
however, due heed will be paid to the distinction between decisions and
dicta. This cannot be expected beyond a minimal degree of textwriters
who deal with thousands of cases. The judicial opinions from which
449. Ibid. He adds, seemingly in defense of decisions in race jurisdictions, that
the courts therein must bar an intending purchaser without notice who does not first
record. Quite so, but that has nothing to do with the problem of notice in those juris-
dictions.
450. Ibid.
451. 3 Wm, NEW YORK LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1938) 1358; citing on
1356 this statement from Abraham v. Mayer, 7 Misc. 250, 253, 27 N. Y. Supp. 264, 266
(894) : "Intending purchasers of land are only required to search . . . against
. . . [each] grantor during the time that the record title remains in him." This, to
be sure, is only from the City Court of New York, but no doubt it also states modern
professional understanding.
452. The editions used are the 4th and 5th of Pomaaoy, op. cit. supra note 376; the
8th of JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 369; the 2d and 3d of TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note
376; and the ist (and only) edition of PATrON, LAND TrrLs (938).
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their compilations of citations have always been largely drawn not
only abound with original dicta 453 but habitually cite earlier dicta
indiscriminately with decisions, except when a distinction between the
two types of authority serves a defensive purpose--as those discussed
below will clearly illustrate. The elder Judge Lumpkin once illustrated
the difficulty of avoiding this judicial sin when, at the conclusion of
ironical comments upon dicta regarding the point before him, he seem-
ingly slipped with casualness (but possibly with continued irony) into
a monstrous example of his own, exclaiming: "Let us hear no more
fault finding . . . with obiter dicta. Three-fourths of all the law in
force in Christendom, as can be demonstrated by reference to the
English and American Reports, originated in the obiter dicta of Courts
and Judges." 454 Be that as it may, the titles of all cases listed below
which are in point as respects decision, even though that be supported
by opinions which are vitiated by manifest weaknesses or which con-
tain no discussion of the problem or cite no authorities, are printed
in italics. The titles of cases, however, which cannot possibly be recog-
nized as decisions on the point in issue are not italicized; nor are those
of cases that have been overruled, or fatally discredited by later deci-
sions, or which were decided in race jurisdictions without explicit
ruling on the issue of notice. The justification for these distinctions
is indicated in the analyses of the cases.
CASES SUPPORTING THE FIRST VIEW
The following cases allegedly support this view: 45 New York:
Van Rensselaer v. Clark (1837) ,4  Jackson ex d. Merrick v. Post
(I836), 457 Schutt v. Large (1849),48 Ring v. Steele (I867), 4 9
Goelet v. McManus (1874); 40 Massachusetts: Flynt v. Arnold
(1841) ; 41 Iowa: English v. Waples (1862),4 62 Sims v. Hammond
(1872),463 Gardner v. Early (1887) ; 4 6 Illinois: Bayles v. Young
(1869),465 Morrison v. Kelly (1859),46 Simmons v. Stum
(1882); 4 7 California: Mahoney v. Middleton (1871),468 Clark v.
453. For example, see p. 288 and note 305 supra.
454. Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 299 (1858). (Italics supplied.)
455. See note 452 szpra.
456. 17 Wend. 25 (N. Y. 1837).
457. 15 Wend. 588 (N. Y. 1836).
458. 6 Barb. 373 (N. Y. 1849).
459. 3 Keyes 450 (N. Y. 1867).
46o. i Hun 3o6 (N. Y. 1874).
461. 43 Mass. 619 (1841).
462. 13 Iowa 57 (1862).
463. 33 Iowa 368 (1872).
464. 72 Iowa 518 (1887).
465. 51 III. 127 (z869).
466. 22 Ill. 6Io (1859).
467. 101 Ill. 454 (1882).
468. 41 Cal. 41 (1871).
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Sawyer (1874) ,469 County Bank of San Luis Obispo v. Fox
(1897) ; 4 7 Wisconsin: Erwin v. Lewis (1873),4"1 Fallass v. Pierce
(0872),472 Butler v. Bank (1896) ; 4 7 3 Michigan: Cook v. French
(1893) ; 474 Van Aken v. Gleason (1876) ; 75 Missouri: Allen v. Ray
(1888) ;476 Mississippi: Woods v. Garnett (1894) ; 477 South Dakota:
Parrish v. Mahany (1897) ; 4 7 Texas: Ryle v. Davidson (I 9 o8 ),4
7 9
Delay v. Truitt (1916),40 White v. McGregor (1899) ; 481 Arkansas:
White v. Moffett (913) ; 42 Montana: Guerin v. Sunburst Oil & Gas
CO. (1923) .4
These cases will be considered by jurisdictions, which are arranged
above in the order in which they became more or less committed to the
doctrine in question.
New York (a notice-race jurisdiction) has consistently supported
the first view. Van Rensselaer v. Clark 484 is indicated as the leading
case because its opinion is the earliest that is in point. It has already
been seen that the earlier opinion in Jackson ex d. Merrick v. Post 4 5
neither stated nor implied that record notice was given by B's deed; on
the contrary, the decision was based on inquiry notice, on which ground
it is completely indefensible. 4 6  The Schutt case is even remoter from
the question under examination. 48 7  The other cases cited are decisions
in point.
469. 48 Cal. 133 (1874).
470. iig Cal. 61, 5I Pac. 11 (1897).
471. 32 Wis. 276 (1873).
472. 30 Wis. 443 (1872).
473. 94 Wis. 351, 68 N. W. 998 (1896).
474. 96 Mich. 525, 56 N. W. 1O1 (1893).
475. 34 Mich. 477 (1876).
476. 96 Mo. 542, 10 S. W. 153 (1888).
477. 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (1894).
478. 1O S. D. 276, 73 N. W. 97 (1897).
479. 116 S. W. 823 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o8).
480. 182 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. I916).
481. 92 Tex. 556, 50 So. 564 (1899).
482. io8 Ark. 49o, 158 S. W. 505 (1913).
483. 68 Mont. 365, 218 Pac. 949 (1923).
484. 17 Wend. 25 (N. Y. 1837).
485. 15 Wend. 588 (N. Y. 1836).
486. See text pp. 4o3-4 supra.
487. 6 Barb. 373 (N. Y. 1849). If in this case D had any notice of B's deed it
was inquiry notice, for the deed -was never recorded, having in fact been destroyed by
collusion between A and C. The case was sent back for retrial because the lower
court had ruled that D's good faith "was an immaterial question." The case, more-
over, has no merits. Its references to Van Rensselaer v. Clark, 17 Wend. 25 (N . Y.
1837), are misleading. Also, the court said that if D (who was the second grantee
under C) had notice he would fail "although nothing appeared" to bring home to C's
first grantee any knowledge of B's deed or C's fraud! Schutt v. Large, 6 Barb. 373,
381 (N. Y. 1849).
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Flynt v. Arnold 485 contained mere dicta favorable to the view in
support of which it is here cited; but, as has already been seen, those
dicta have been repudiated in Massachusetts.
48 9  
,
Iowa is a pure-notice jurisdiction.4 10  The English case involved
assignment of a junior mortgage. The court said that the assignee, if
regarded as taking merely a chose in action, was bound by the equities
against his assignor who had actual notice of the senior instrument;
and that, if regarded as a "purchaser," he had constructive notice of
the senior mortgage which was recorded before the assignment to him
of the junior.4 91  Since the latter is now the established law, the case
can be regarded as a holding in accord with the first view. Sims v.
Hammond 492 is for several reasons neither in point nor, on its own
basis, acceptable. 498  Gardner v. Early 49' is likewise not in point; it
turned on inquiry notice only.495 In Iowa, therefore, only a single case
supports the first view; and that only because an assignee of a mort-
gage has, since that decision, become a "purchaser." Strictly, there is
as yet no Iowa authority. Moreover, the English case neither discussed
the problem nor cited authorities. It merely assumed that a recorded
deed should give constructive notice to any subsequent purchaser.
488. 43 Mass. 61g (1841).
489. See pp. 408 sapra and 434 infra.
49o. See Bordwell, Recording of Instruments Affecting Land (i916) 2 IOWA L.
BULL. 51, 52-3. PATTON, LAND TITLES (1938) § 9 and notes 1O5-6.
491. English v. Waples, 13 Iowa 57 (1862).
492. 33 Iowa 368 (1872).
493. A deed of Oct. ioth from B to A, and a mortgage of the same date from A to
C, were recorded on the i2th an hour before a purchase money mortgage from A to
B, dated as of the 12th, was recorded. C had knowledge, when he took his own, that
B really received on the ioth a purchase money mortgage which was destroyed, and
replaced by that dated as of the I2th. Now, (I) C's actual knowledge could not be
imputed to D, provided the latter be treated as a purchaser. And, (2) from the rec-
ord D could only learn that his vendor, C, held a deed of earlier date than B's and
first recorded. However, (3) the court followed the first alternative stated in the
opinion in English v. Waples, 13 Iowa 57 (1862), saying: "The assignment of the
mortgage . . . was the assignment of a chose in action, and not an interest in lands.
. . . The plaintiff [D] purchased his mortgage and parted with his money after de-
fendant's [B's] mortgage was recorded, and could, therefore, be in no better situation
than his assignor, and coidd claim no greater or other equities." Sims v. Hammond,
33 Iowa 368, 373 (1872). (Italics supplied.) Finally, (4) the prior recording of B's
mortgage has nothing, logically, to do with the chose-in-action rule.
494. 72 Iowa 518 (1887).
495. As regards D (Early) and his grantees of part of the land the court con-
cluded that they "had such knowledge of the conveyance to the plaintiffs as to have
required them . . . to ascertain the facts in reference thereto." Id. at 52o. They
took their deed long after B's (the plaintiff's) deed was recorded. The above state-
ment, unlike the opinion in English v. Waples, 13 Iowa 57 (1862), did not attribute
record notice to B's deed, nor even inquiry notice by it. The knowledge referred to is
seemingly knowledge of facts off the record. The opinion also erroneously states that
"it was incumbent on [C] to show that she was an innocent purchaser for value, with-
out notice." Id. at 52o. It was, of course, incumbent on D, and on him alone, to show
this, if, failing on his own merits, he sought to prevail by virtue of his grantor's merits.
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Illinois is, as respects the form of its statutes, a pure-notice juris-
diction. 496  It was committed to the first view by Bayles v. Young,
49 7
a direct decision. However, the opinion cited no authorities and con-
tained no discussion whatever of the problem. As for Morrison v.
Kelly,498 what the court intended to decide is doubtful. The only
basis on which the case can possibly rest, however, is inquiry notice,
the sole reference to record notice being patently erroneous under estab-
lished Illinois law-and equally erroneous everywhere else.499  Sim-
mons v. Stum r00 is likewise not in point. It involved no question of
record notice whatever; it turned upon the burden of proof, as in a
notice-race jurisdiction, respecting prior recordation. 501
California is a notice-race jurisdiction. 50 2  Mahoney v. Middle-
ton 50 3 cited and followed without discussion the New York cases
already analyzed, pleading that the press of judicial business precluded
consideration "of this interesting question, or a review of the authori-
ties bearing upon it." But the case is a clear authority. The court's
conclusion was based on record notice given by B's deed to D, who
496. The form of the statute since 1845, and one remarkable complexity left in the
law by Mr. Brayman, the author of the Revision of that year, have already been com-
mented upon. See p. 284 and note 292 supra. The revision also changed the Illinois
statute from a notice-race to a notice type. The law was originally that of Pennsyl-
vania, whence the first statute of the Northwest Territory was taken. See text at
notecalls 39, 52, 53. This was left unchanged in the revisions of i8o7, 1815, 1827, 1833.
LAWS OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY (Pease, ed., 17 Illinois Historical Collections,
1925) 123, 199; LAWS OF INDIANA TEmRTORY (Philbrick, ed., 21 Illinois Historical
Collections, 1930) 290; 2 PoPE's DIGEST (Philbrick, ed., 30 Illinois Historical Col-
lections, 1940) 288; REVISED CODE OF LAWS OF ILLixOIS (1827) 101; REvISED LAWS
Or ILLINOIS OF 1833, §§ 15, 17. Mr. Patton says that "though the Illinois act follows
Massachusetts in phraseology, it follows New York and Wisconsin in construction."
PATrON, LAIND TITLES (1938) § 46 n. 79. This is, I think, not sustained by all the
cases, but it certainly is by some, as illustrated by Simmons v. Stun, referred to in the
text at notecall 5O1 infra and note thereto.
497. 51 Ill. 127 (1869).
498. 22 Ill. 61o (I859).
499. C had inquiry notice of B's rights both by the latter's possession of the land
and by information received from an interested party. The court said: "If [C] was
chargeable with notice when he purchased, his grantee, recdiving a conveyance after
the deed to [B] was recorded, would be chargeable with the same notice that [C]
had." Id. at 627. This extraordinary proposition is all there is in the opinion that
applies to our problem. The court also said, of the notice had by posession and by
information: "And having notice . . . he could not protect himself by waiting some
months and then taking a conveyance without further inquiry, or by removing the im-
provements, that were sufficient notice when he first purchased." rd. at 625. This made
it quite correctly a case of inquiry notice.
500. 101 Ill. 454 (1882).
5Ol. In such a jurisdiction it would be necessary to prove prior recordation. D
would bear this burden, but there was no evidence whatever as to when he recorded,
whereas the date of B's recording was definite. The court therefore explicitly stated
that the question of notice need not be inquired into. Id. at 456. In fact, however, D
took his deed before B's was recorded, so that, as regarded record notice, no question
existed. The court, in its last remark, must therefore bave had in mind some matter
of inquiry notice which does not appear in the opinion.
502. For the statute as it.existed in 1871 see Mahoney v. Middleton, 41 Cal. 41, 47
(1871). It has always so remained.
503. Ibid.
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took his conveyance from C after that deed was recorded, and it was
explicitly stated that the question whether D had actual knowledge of
B's interest need not, therefore, be discussed.50 4  Clark v. Sawyer 101
followed the preceding case, also without discussion, with the remark:
"We see no reason for changing the ruling here." 506 County Bank of
San Luis Obispo v. Fox 507 supplies merely a dictum, but it is clear
and direct. It did not appear when the assignments of the mortgage
from C to D and D to E were made, nor whether for consideration,
nor whether they were ever recorded. They might, the court said,
both have been made after B's mortgage was recorded, and if so, "the
assignees took . . . with constructive notice of the prior mortgage,"
citing the two preceding cases. 508
Wisconsin has likewise always been a notice-race jurisdiction.50 9
Considering that there were five arguments of Fallass v. Pierce,51 0
that four opinions were written therein, two of them by Chief Justice
Dixon, and that the various problems involved had been troubling
him 511 ever since he had joined six years earlier in the decision in Ely
v. Wilcox,51 2 the case as he left it is far from impressive or satisfying.
The Chief Justice's opinions do have very considerable educational
value, in that they discussed basic recording principles and queries, and
for this reason they have already several times been cited herein.5 15
Nevertheless, in their disposal of the problem before the court they dis-
played surprising weaknesses. After devoting a third of his two opin-
ions to discussion of what was dictum and what decision in Ely v.
504. Id. at 5o. There is, however, present in one statement by the court a seem-
ing but doubtless unintended implication that prior recording by D would, alone, have
sufficed to save him. Speaking of the conveyance by C (Pichoir and Spear, both of
whom had actual knowledge of the prior conveyance to B, Mahoney, and to D, Borel),
the court said: "Their conveyance to Borel, standing by itself, passed no title, and the
only mode in which it could have been made effectual, was by recording it before the
deeds to Mahoney were recorded." Ibid.
505. 48 Cal. 133 (1874).
5o6. Id. at 143.
507. I19 Cal. 61, 5i Pac. ii (I897).
5o8. Id. at 64, 51 Pac. at 12. The assignees were treated as purchasers. They
failed, manifestly, to bear the burden of proving prior recordation; nevertheless, the
court chose to pass judgment on the other requirement of notice. See p. 162 supra.
509. The statute as it existed at the time of the earliest case cited, Fallass v. Pierce,
30 Wis. 443 (1872), is quoted therein at 457.
510. Cf. id. at 455, 461.
5U. He so stated, id. at 465-6.
512. 20 Wis. 523 (1866) discussed in the text at pp. 435-8 infra.
513. He properly emphasized the fact that the first but unrecorded conveyance is,
save as affected by the recording acts, wholly valid-Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 473
(1872) ; that the basic purpose of those acts is to protect the subsequent purchaser-
see note 65 supra and text at notecall 635 infra; that bona fides under the recording
system has a very specific and narrow meaning-see note 22 supra; that it refers solely
to the subsequent purchaser-see note 20 supra. Also, he made very clear the dif-
ference between pure-notice and notice-race statutes. See p. 422 and p. 424 at notecall
534 infra and citations in notes 431, 433 supra. Adverse comments made upon other
positions taken in the opinion are made at bpp. 164-.5 suppr.
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Wilcox, 514 he left the decision in the Fallass case itself in great ob-
scurity. No question whatever of record notice, by B's deed to D,51 5
was before the court, as the dissenting Justice repeatedly emphasized, 510
since D took his deed before that to B (or that to C) was recorded.
As for notice otherwise, it was admitted that he had none. The state-
ment of facts correctly describes him as "a purchaser in good faith, and
for value, who neglected to put his deed upon record until after the
assignments of the mortgages to [B] . . . and . . . Fallass . . .
were made and recorded." 517 The Chief Justice's elaborate attention
to "the question, whether a purchaser [D] from a second grantee [C],
whose deed [C's] was first recorded, is bound to take notice of the
record of a prior deed from the same grantor to another person [B],
subsequently recorded, and before the time of such purchase" 518 was
due to a desire "so to lay down and expound the law of the case as not
to conflict with what was said as by the cou~rt in Ely v. Wilcox." 519
What was said "as by the court" in that case was written by a former
member of the court who was counsel for the successful party in the
later case. The question quoted just above had nothing to do with the
case before the Chief Justice; all that he wished to say on it would be
dictum. His object was to show that everything said on it in the Ely
opinion was also dictum 52 -- that is, dictum adverse to what he now
wished to say of it. Restive under the Chief Justice's elaborate analysis
of the earlier opinion (from which there had been no dissent when it
was rendered, although Dixon had then been Chief Justice), counsel
finally retorted that "all that is said by this court about the case of
Ely v. Wilcox, or upon the question of constructive notice, is inap-
plicable here." 521 Quite so. And since no issue of record notice was
514. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 455-6, 464-8, 47o-I (1872).
515. The letters used in the text to identify the parties correspond to the actual
names as follows: A, Blanchard; B, Rice; C, Pierce; D, Parks. Fallass was an as-
signee of Rice, taking his interest after Parks had taken his, but recording earlier than
Parks recorded.
56. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 447, 448, 451 (1872). Justice Cole did not
formally dissent from the final judgment of his two fellow judges, but his two opinions
(given when one of them had still agreed with him) are in effect dissenting opinions.
517. Id. at 445. (Italics supplied.)
518. Id. at 456. (Italics supplied.)
519. Id. at 455. (Italics supplied.)
52o. His statement shows the identity of the two questions. Speaking of the opinion
in Ely v. Wilcox, he said: "What was there said about the record of a prior deed not
recorded till after the secnzd deed from the same grantor, and before the conveyance
by the vendee in the second deed, not being notice to the purchaser from the vendee
in the second deed, must be regarded only as an expression of the views of the judge
who wrote the opinion, and not as . . . any matter determined by the court ...
As a member of the court at the time that case was decided, I know that the point
was not considered or attempted to be adjudged by the court, and but for what thus
irregularly found its way into the opinion, I am quite satisfied that the history of the
case would have been very different." Id. at 455-6.
521. Id. at 464.
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presented, it was wholly proper to leave that, as we have seen it was
left,522 without explicit decision--contrary to many citations of the
case, by judges and textwriters, as having decided it.
It was not proper, however, even in dictum, to assume that if B's
deed had been recorded before D's -was taken it would have given
constructive notice to the latter. Ostensibly, the Chief Justice did not
make that assumption; he attempted to give reasons. It has been seen,
however, that one was an absurdity and that the other begged the
question.528  In substance there was nothing but assumption. As for
discussion of the problem, as one of pure theory, there was absolutely
not a word; the Chief Justice merely said, "even supposing B's deed
on record was not constructive notice, which I cannot believe to be
the law under our statute." 524 And even this was not in the final
opinion, but in one on the question of a rehearing. In the final opinion
there are merely bare references to good faith as one of the two require-
ments which the subsequent purchaser must meet in a notice-race juris-
diction. 525  Moreover, as regards the practical consideration of the
reasonableness of search imposed upon D if the B deed gives him
notice, it has been earlier pointed out that this, although not ignored,
was peremptorily dismissed as "impertinent, and therefore deceptive
and liable to lead to error." 526
The sole question decided in the case was that, even though with-
out notice of any kind, a subsequent purchaser must fail in a notice-
race jurisdiction unless he also first records.
Erwin v. Lewis 52 7 purported to follow the Fallass case. The
decision in the Fallass case could not be followed, since in that case
D's deed was taken before B's was recorded, whereas the contrary was
true in the Erwin case. In a notice-race jurisdiction, therefore, judg-
ment would necessarily be given for B, although such decision might
be rested either on D's failure to record first, or on constructive notice
given to him by B's record, or on both. As already several times re-
marked, 528 no case in a notice-race state can be authority on the point
of record notice unless explicit on that point. It is impossible to say
what was the ground upon which the court based its decision. It said:
"The recording of the mortgage [to B] before the conveyance to [D]
was recorded, gave the mortgage priority over such conveyance, and
it is entirely immaterial that she [D] did not know that her grantor
522. Text at notecall 433 supra.
523. See pp. 397, 411 supra.
524. 30 Wis. 443, 459 (1872).
525. Id. at 473-5, 477-8.
526. See text at notecall 132 supra.
527. 32 Wis. 276 (1873).
528. See p. 162 supra.
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[C] was not a bona fide purchaser of the premises." 529 Had this
statement been based upon an explicit holding that the recorded mort-
gage would give constructive notice, there would have been a clear
application of the dictum in the Fallass opinion. But the court at once
returned to the confusion in the Pallass case, adding: "When she [D]
found the mortgage of record . . . "--which was not a fact in the
case-"this was sufficient to put her upon inquiry as to whether [C]
was a bona fide purchaser for value. After the recording of the mort-
gage she purchased at her peril. Had her grantor been a bona fide
purchaser for value, she would have held the premises by a title para-
mount to the mortgage. But her grantor not being a bona fide pur-
chaser, her title is subordinate to the mortgage. It was so held in
Fallass v. Pierce." 530 There was, of course, no holding on any of
these points in the Fallass case. The writer of the Erwin opinion had
concurred in the Fallass case in two opinions by Justice Cole and had
then concurred in the two contrary and (by his adherence) prevailing
opinions given by Chief Justice Dixon. It is clear that he still per-
sisted in his confusion, which Dixon, still Chief Justice, found it un-
necessary or impossible to remove. To assume discovery of the prior
deed when this was not actually seen, or knowledge otherwise had of
it, was egregious error. This was a repetition of the Chief Justice's
loose language in the Fallass case.53 1 It passes understanding how the
error could be overlooked when the very issue before the court was
whether the deed should be held to be giving record notice, and con-
structive knowledge of it be therefore attributed to D. The reference
to inquiry, relating as it does only to the good or bad faith of C, and
being wholly immaterial as the court stated to the issue before it, leaves
the decision resting on record notice, although that is not explicitly
stated. For this reason the case has been listed as the leading case in
Wisconsin in our problem. In fact it is the only case, although a very
poor one.
Butler v. Bank of Mazeppa rz is not in point. The lower court
made no finding upon D's good or bad faith, with reference either to
notice by the record or through facts off the record. The appellate
court explicitly stated: "We shall assume that the purchase was in
529. 32 Wis. 276-7 (1873).
530. Id. 277. The statement of the case indicates that the lower court had decided
for D "for the reason that, although when she purchased the premises she was charge-
able with notice of the existence of the mortgage in suit, she did not know that [C]
her grantor, was a fraudulent grantee of the premises." Id. at 276. The origin of this
perduring confusion has already, been explained; see p. 4o2 et seq. sz=pra. It is re-
tained in the headnote to the case.
531. See p. 411 supra.
532. 94 Wis. 351, 68 N. W. 998 (I896).
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good faith." 533 D was subordinated to B because he did not record
first. As the court quite correctly states, "This was the doctrine finally
adopted, after great deliberation and argument, in the case of Fallass
v. Pierce." 534
Michigan has always been a notice-race jurisdiction. 5 3 5  Cook v.
French 536 presents only a dictum. The case was remarkable in its
facts. B was true and record owner and conveyed to A by a deed
never recorded. A, the common grantor in our problem, gave to B a
purchase-money mortgage that was recorded in the afternoon, and to
C-who, however, knew of the mortgage, and doubtless also of A's
true title-an unconditional deed that was recorded in the morning,
of the same day.5,37 Our problem was disposed of in five lines, without
citation of authorities or discussion of principles: "When [D, second
grantee under C] acquired his title, the mortgage from [A] to [B]
was on record . . . and this was notice to him of the claim that [B]
made upon the premises. He therefore took his title subject to any
equities which [B] had under the mortgage." 538 Had A been record
owner, the case would have presented our problem, and the decision
would have been a direct holding in favor of the New York view. But
A was not record owner; so that the case does not fall under the
problem to be discussed in the present section of this article, but under
the first of the six abnormal situations already discussed both with
reference to record notice and inquiry notice,5 39 although the latter was
not mentioned. The case holds that D, seeking earlier grantees of A,
must discover him as such in a purchase money mortgage recorded
after the recording of A's unconditional conveyance to C. In addition
to being irrelevant to our present problem for the reason above stated,
the decision is bad if arguments elsewhere stated be accepted. 540 It
may be added that although D was negligent in taking a deed dependent
for validity upon A's unrecorded rights, nevertheless A did have true
title. Whether D took that title bona fide, and so could keep it, was
the question; but his negligence could in no way affect that question.
533. Id. at 354, 68 N. W. at 999. The notice point was ignored, evidently, because
B's mortgage was taken first, but later exchanged for an extension mortgage, which
latter was alone recorded, an hour later than the recording of C's mortgage. On the
record, C's appeared to be both senior in date and senior of record, although C knew
the actual fact
534. Id. at 356, 68 N. W. at 1ooo.
535. See MIcH. Comp. L. (929) § 133o4 and earlier statutes cited in the note on
the history of that section.
536. 96 Mich. 525, 56 N. W. 1oi (1893). In our lettering A is Kerr; B, Cook;
C, Marshall; and of various grantees under C, D is French (really the second trans-
feree under C).
537. Id. at 527-8, 56 N. W. at ioi.
538. Id. at 529, 56 N. W. at 1o2.
539. See pp. 167, i68 et seq., 297, 299-303 supr.
540. Ibid.
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Nor can the decision be sustained, assuming it be conceded that D
was mistakenly held to have taken his deed with notice of B's rights,
on the ground that in a notice-race jurisdiction he must also gain
priority of record, and obviously D had not done so. To say that a
subsequent purchaser, although he has no record notice from an isolated
recorded paper because he has no means of discovering it, is neverthe-
less defeated in a notice-race jurisdiction by its prior recording, would
be a palpable injustice. In truth, however, the race-to-the-record prin-
ciple has no relation to such a situation. That rule assumes a race in
putting titles on the record; B has not recorded a title, but only an
individual document that was unconnected with record title.
541
Van Aken v. Gleason 542 is likewise not in point. Our problem
is one of priorities, the question being whether D has record notice of
B's deed. In the Van Aken case A's two conveyances were given on
the same day, B's being first acknowledged but C's first recorded.
There was no preference agreement, and the court found that the two
mortgages were intended to be "on the same footing." "Although,"
it said, "the bill is framed on the theory of priority," the prayer for
general relief justified the relief proper under the other principle. It
therefore decreed foreclosure and sale, and a ratable application of the
proceeds to the two mortgages if insufficient to pay both.543  The
court did, however, remark: "Inasmuch as complainant when he pur-
chased the [C] mortgage had constructive notice by the record of the
[B] mortgage, of which [C] was actually informed, we think such
notice as the record gave him was binding." 544 This reference to
priorities is manifestly dictum. Moreover, it is susceptible of the in-
terpretation that notice to D may result from C's state of mind, and
that hoary error 545 is accordingly introduced into the headnote of the
case. Assuming that the reporter's was also the court's understanding
of its words, the statement has no bearing even as dictum on our
problem.
Missouri is a pure-notice jurisdiction.548 The case cited 546a has
nothing to do with our problem, and falls wholly outside the recording
541. See p. 299 supra.
542. 34 Mich. 477 (1876).
543. Id. at 48o.
544. Id. at 479.
545. See p. 402 et seq. sup ra.
546. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) §§ 3427-8, 351. Mr. Patton's citation of Missouri as
a race state is erroneous. PATTON, LAND TITLES (1938) § I0 at notecall iii. In form
the statute is of the invalid-till-recorded type (see pp. 127, 282 and note 292 supra)
but it is construed simply as a notice act, as is shown by three cases cited by Mr. Pat-
ton: Ladd v. Anderson, 133 Mo. 625, 34 S. W. 872 (1895) ; Elliott v. Buffington, 149
Mo. 663, 51 S. W. 408 (x899); Hays v. Pumphrey, 226 Mo. 119, 125 S. W. 1109
(9o9).
546a. Allen v. Ray, 96 Mo. 542, 1o S. W. 153 (1888),
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system. The question presented therein was that of priority between
two titles ostensibly deraigning from a common grantor, a patentee
whose title was never connected with the record, one title originating
while he held the actual title and the other after he had parted with it.
54
7
Mississippi is likewise a pure-notice jurisdiction.54 s In Woods
v. Garnett 5'9 C's mortgage was taken (and recorded, which was im-
material) after B's mortgage had been recorded with an imperfect ac-
knowledgment. An agent of C had seen and read this record, and the
court held that C had inquiry notice. Later, B's deed was reacknowl-
edged and re-recorded before C's conveyance to D, who admittedly had
no "actual" notice. It was held that the deed gave D record notice.550
The case is a square holding on our problem. Further, it has the
merits of discussing it, and of recognizing the connection between
record search and record notice. However, as already seen, the court
spurned the idea that any search required of a purchaser can be un-
reasonable; and, as a secondary reason for its decision, offered a
proposition which has already been examined and found to be without
merit.55"
South Dakota is a notice-race, and also a tract recording, juris-
diction.'5 2  For the latter reason the case of Parrish v. Mahany 3
can have no relevance to our problem so far as its solution be admitted
to turn on the test of reasonable search, since it is conceded that search
can reasonably be required under a tract recording system for the deeds
that are now under discussion, and that record notice by them can
therefore justly be imputed to a purchaser.'5 4 But, ignoring that
aspect of the case, it is not a direct authority on our problem, and for
several reasons is entitled to very scant attention.
If D be barred by notice of any type from taking in good faith,
he can only prevail if his grantor, C, took title as a bona fide purchaser.
Throughout the opinion it is assumed that D was barred, and attention
547. Defendant claimed as purchaser at a tax sale. The defendant in the tax suit
was X, who had never been record owner of the land; and the proceeding could not
operate in rem against the land because the statute limited that effect to suits against
the person appearing to be the record owner. Moreover, although X had once been
actual owner (patentee) he had ceased to be such. No title, therefore, could be ac-
quired by the tax sale. See pp. I69, i8o supra. On the other hand, plaintiff had com-
plete title through mesne conveyances from X. The case lies outside the recording
system. The absence of any record title in X was warning to the defendant when he
purchased at the sale "that the patentee, whoever he might he, had in all probability
parted with his title." 96 Mo. at 548, 10 S. W. at 155.
548. See the statutes, quoted and construed in Craig v. Osborne, 134 Miss. 323, 98
So. 598 (1923).
549. 72 Miss. 78, 16 So. 390 (894).
550. Id. at 84-7, 6 So. at 391.
551. See pp. 164, 413 supra.
552. S. D. ComP. L. (1939) § 3293. Compare PAxmNr, LAND TiTLEs (1938) § 46
n. 8o.
553. io S. D. 276, 73 N. W. 97 (i897).
554. See pp. 165-6 supra.
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is directed primarily to the status of C. But the question here primarily
under consideration is not whether D is prevented by the prior record-
ing of B's deed from being a purchaser in good faith; it is, rather,
Does B's deed give record notice to D? To that answer the opinion
gives no explicit answer. It does contain an explicit affirmation that
D was put upon inquiry-not, however, as to B's rights, but as to C's.
In addition to this, the opinion has the further weakness of implying
that he could be put upon inquiry by the mere recording of B's deed
(since no information otherwise received was involved). The state-
ment of the problem by the court was as follows:
"Plaintiffs [D] are purchasers in good faith for a valuable
consideration, without actual notice of respondent's [B's] convey-
ance and without actual notice that her deed was recorded when
their mortgage was taken. Does the law impute notice [to D] of
such conveyance, and what is the effect of such notice upon"-
seemingly, this means: what limitation is put upon such notice in
the case of-"the mortgagee [D], in good faith, and for a valuable
consideration, of a grantee in a second deed [C], recorded before
the first deed [B's], when the first deed is recorded before the
mortgage is taken?"
The court proceeded to express agreement with the New York cases,
and disagreement with the Massachusetts cases, all of which turn on
the issue of record notice solely. However, it supported its view only,
first, by quoting the question-begging arguments, already analyzed, by
which Chief Justice Dixon sought to sustain his dictum on that issue
in the Fallass case, but confusing his dictum with his decision; 566 and,
secondly, by concurring, as respects the Massachusetts cases, in criti-
cisms of them offered in a Mississippi case which have already been
considered and found to be pointless. T  And then, although inquiry
notice and record notice had been clearly distinguished by the Mis-
sissippi court (C being held to have had inquiry notice, and D record
notice), the South Dakota court stated its own decision thus:
555. Parrish v. Mahany, io S. D. 276, 283, 73 N. W. 97, 99 (1897). (Italics sup-
plied.)
556. Id. at 283-4, 73 N. W. at 99. See pp. 421-2 supra. The court spoke of the dif-
ference between the Massachusetts and Wisconsin statutes-that is between notice and
race statutes-as though it had some bearing on the question before it, io S. D. 276,
283, 73 N. W. 99, 9 (1897). It was vital to the decision in Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis.
443 (1872). It had nothing to do, however, with notice, though the South Dakota court
thought it " "entitled to much weight," and believed that it was following the Wis-
consin decisions. io S. D. 276, 284, 73 N. W. 97, 99 (897). The court did not even
refer to its own recording system by tracts. However, in such a state the attitude of
Chief Justice Dixon toward the test of reasonable search (pp. 164, 413 supra), echoed
in Woods v. Garnett (p. 46 supra), was no doubt wholeheartedly approved.
557. io S. D. at 285, 73 N. W. at 99. And see pp. 413-414 supra for the criticismin question.
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"The record of respondents [B's] deed was sufficient to put
the mortgagees [D] upon inquiry as to whether [C] was a pur-
chaser in good faith, and for a valuable consideration." r58
As respects the first point in this decision, it is clear that if the
required "inquiry" by D had reference to B's rights this would be true
"inquiry notice" respecting the prior hostile title. It has been several
times pointed out, however, that to attribute inquiry notice to a pur-
chaser because a deed is, simply, recorded is a subterfuge to evade the
issue whether record notice is given,56 9 and that it is, moreover, a great
injustice to the purchaser. 60  Such an evasion is particularly un-
necessary under a system of tract recording. Whether such an inquiry
respecting the validity of the title under which D claims is inquiry
notice at all is another question, and one exclusively of terminology.
That it is not properly such seems clear, since it is incidental to a prin-
ciple that has nothing whatever to do with the operation of the record-
ing acts; a principle of equity lying outside of their purview, operative
only after they have independently operated. The "inquiry" in ques-
tion is only an example of the various investigations of possible defects
of title, where notice is not involved, which have several times been
adverted to and distinguished from true notice situations.561
The ultimate disposition of the case turned upon the issue of C's
good or bad faith.562  The opinion's obscurity on the prior question
how the record had barred D was not removed in a second opinion
after a rehearing, except as that opinion revealed that "record notice"
and "put on inquiry by a record" were, in the court's mind, synony-
mous. 563  Strictly speaking, the case is no authority on the point under
558. io S. D. at 285, 73 N. W. at 99. (Italics supplied.)
559. See pp. 267, 305 upra.
56o. See pp. 130-I, 270-I supra.
561. See pp. 264-5, 285-6 supra. Mr. Patton has said that a purchaser who in a
tract-recording state finds both the A-B and A-C deeds recorded is "put on inquiry as
to which held the title." PATToN, LAND TITLES (1938) § 46 n. 8o.
562. That issue was not determined by the lower court. The case was therefore
remanded for further proceedings. In thus disposing of the case, the appellate court
stated that in the absence of any evidence as to C's being a bona fide purchaser "the
presumption is that he did so purchase the premises." Parrish v. Mahany, io S. D.
276, 285, 73 N. W. 97, 100 (1897). On a rehearing the court, receding from its earlier
position as to that presumption, made this final statement: "Without deciding what
presumption should prevail where the subsequent grantee or subsequent incumbrancer
acquires his rights before a prior conveyance has been recorded, we think that where,
as in this case, an incumbrancer's [D's] rights are acquired after the prior conveyance
B's has been recorded"---nota bex, again with no specific statement that it gave D
record notice--"such incumbrancer should assume the burden of proving that his
grantor [C], the grantee in the [first] subsequent conveyance, was a bona fide pur-
chaser for value, without notice of the [B's] prior conveyance." Parrish v. Mahany,
12 S. D. 278, 283, 81 N. W. 295, 296 (1899).
563. The court merely remarked: "Having decided that respondent's deed shall be
deemed to have been recorded when plaintiffs parted with the consideration of their
mortgage, this court concluded that if [C], their mortgagor, purchased 'in good faith,
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discussion, containing at most a dictum by implication. Even if a
ruling were present, the opinion would reduce it to scanty significance.
Texas is a pure-notice jurisdiction.50 4 Both Ryle v. Davidson "5
and Delay v. Truitt 566 are square decisions. They were preceded by a
dictum in White v. McGregor.567 There is no discussion in the Ryle
case. In the Delay case there is one paragraph of discussion, not above
criticism.5 " The decision is also unsatisfactory in two respects. Delay
(D) was the fourth grantee under C; the defendant, Truitt, was B.
A forged deed, purportedly from B to one of plaintiff's predecessors
under C, was included among the title instruments delivered to Delay,
and the court said that this put him upon inquiry by suggesting "that
a deed from Truitt was necessary to perfect the title." 519 No addi-
tional facts that could indicate anything dangerous to him in this deed
are stated. The natural conclusion to be drawn from the presence of
such a deed among his title instruments would be, seemingly, that it
was a complete irrelevance.5 7 0  Besides, it came from his predecessors
who claimed, like himself, 'under C-not from any person claiming
under B's hostile title.57 1 But, ignoring both of these objections, there
are still two others. The first is that a forged deed is a nullity that
cannot affect title, and therefore should give no record notice 572 nor
inquiry notice 573 as a matter of recording policy, if the policy is really
to favor subsequent purchasers. The second is that, assuming D to be
and for a valuable consideration,' he was the owner of the land, and the lien of the
plaintiff's mortgage is superior to the claims of the respondent. . . ." Parrish v.
Mahany, 12 S. D. 278, 282, 81 N; W. 295, 296 (1899). And again: "When plaintiffs'
mortgage was taken, respondent s conveyance was of record. Plaintiffs had'-nota
bene-"record notice that [C's] title was in doubt, and, as was stated in our former de-
cision, 'the record of respondent's deed was sufficient to put the mortgagees upon in-
quiry.'" Id. at 283, 8r N. W. at 296. (Italics supplied.)
564. T~x. ANN. R:v. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925), §§ 1289, 6646; cf. Webb, A
Treatise on the Law of Record of Title (i8go) § 477.
565. ii6 S. W. 823 (Tex. Civ. App. i9o8). The case is interesting on the point
of burden of proof; see n. 8i supra, Cf. 1i6 S. W. 823, 828-9 with principles stated in
Delay v. Truitt, 182 S. W. 732, 735 (Tex. Civ. App. i916), syllabus points (8) and
(9). See also Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, Io8-9 (i91o).
566. 182 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. I916).
567. 92 Tex. 556, s58, 5o S. W. 564 (1899).
568. 182 S. W. at 736 (para. ii). The court said: "The latter's [B's] deed, how-
ever, being a prior one in date [to C's], though subsequent of record, and the holder
of the second deed [C] having notice of the first deed, all subsequent purchasers were
further affected with notice afforded by the record, and would lose the land." Ibid.
This seems to mean that because C had knowledge of B's deed, the record of the latter
gives notice to all subsequent purchasers. The remark was made in commenting upon
Jackson v. Post, i5 Wend. 588 (N. Y. 1836), and reflects the confusion attaching to
that and other old cases already discussed; see p. 402 et seq. supra. Moreover, from the
references to that case both in the Delay opinion and in White v. McGregor, 92 Tex.
556, 50 S. W. 564 (1899) one would infer that the court in both cases overlooked the
fact that the decision in the Post case was based on inquiry, not on record notice; see
pp. 402-4 supra.
569. 182 S. W. 732, 735 (Tex. Civ. App. I916) under syllabus point (7).
570. See pp. 177-80 supra.
571. See pp. 26o-I, 276, 291-5, 305-6 supra.
572. See pp. I68, 177 supra.
573. See pp. 275-281, 296-3o3 supra.
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put upon inquiry, he could learn nothing thereby save the existence of
the recording problem presented later to the court, and it has repeatedly
been pointed out that it would be both fatuous and unjust to bar D for
bad faith merely because of his failure to anticipate the court's opinion
as to the relative rights of B and D.574  It would be equally unjust to
deny him good faith because he failed to discover a forgery. All this,
however, does not alter the fact that the court explicitly held that D
had record notice of B's title.575 .
Arkansas is a pure-notice jurisdiction.576  The decision in White
v. Moffett r77 was not given on the ground of record notice by B's
deed, which was recorded after the first conveyance under C, but on
the theory of actual notice. The court said: "We do not deem it neces-
sary to determine whether they [D and wife] were bound to take notice
of such deed from its record, for the reason that . . . [D] .
had notice in fact of the deed . . . the abstract of title furnished
them showing such deed ;" 57s and again, "Appellants had actual notice
of the deed before purchasing the land and knew that it was prior in
time to [A's] deed to [C] and her [C's] deed to [him] under whom
he [D] claims title." 579 The "actual notice" referred to in these
quoted passages is clearly true inquiry notice, in the sense adopted in
this discussion. 580 The decision, therefore, was not pertinent to our
problem.
The opinion contains a statement by the court that "it is also a
well-established principle of law that a purchaser of real estate must
take notice of all prior recorded instruments in the i-ne of his purchased
574. Citations in note 56o supra.
575. 182 S. W. at 734, 735-6, under syllabus point (2) as respects land certificate,
and under syllabus points (io) and (i) as respects the deed to B.
576. DIG. STAT. ARx. (Pope, 1937) § 1847; but a race rule governs mortgages, id.
§ 9435. See also Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368, 112 S. W. 373 (1908).
577. io8 Ark. 490, 158 S. W. 505 (1913).
578. Id. at 496-7, i58 S. W. at 5o7. The third grantee under C is here referred to
as D.
579. Id. at 498, 158 S. W. at 507.
580. See p. 266 supra. The opinion quotes the following passage from an earlier
Arkansas case in which the notice given by the mere recording of a deed was declared
to include record notice of anything therein that should suffice to put a prudent
purchaser upon inquiry. "A person purchasing an interest in land, 'takes with con-
structive notice of whatever appears in the conveyance constituting [a link in] his
chain of title.' If anything appears in such conveyance 'sufficient to put a prudent man
on inquiry, which, if prosecuted with ordinary diligence, would lead to actual notice
of some right or title in conflict with that which he is about to purchase, it is his duty
to make the inquiry, and if he does not make it he is guilty of bad faith or negligence,'
and the law will charge him with the actual notice he would have received if he had
made it." Gaines v. Summers, 50 Ark. 322, 327, 7 S. W. 301, 302 (1887) embodying
quotations from Stroud v. Pace, 35 Ark. 100, 103 (1879) quoted in White v. Moffett,
io8 Ark. 490, 496, 158 S. W. 505, 507 (1913). This is, of course, quite correct, as has
been pointed out in commenting upon recitals. See p. 273 supra and note 584 infra.
But the decision in White v. Moffett was not concerned with the "constructive notice!'
and "actual notice" referred to in the quoted passage, but with inquiry notice given by
matter dhors the record.
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title." 581 If the italicized words be disregarded, this proposition would
mean that B's deed gave record notice to D; and, in view of the wording
of the passage first quoted above, it is possible that the court intended
this to be the meaning of this additional statement. But if the italicized
words are given the meaning that would prima facie properly attach
to them-a meaning which would certainly exclude a deed by A to B
recorded after the recording of that by A to C through which D claims
-then the proposition becomes one that B's deed would not give D
record notice. The issue thus uncovered is, of course, the very ques-
tion here under discussion; namely, whether the quoted phrase should
or should not, in the situation before us, have the usual and prima facie
meaning indicated.
It seems, then, that the White case contains nothing, either as to
decision or as to dictum, that bears on the problem here under dis-
cussion, unless it be the proposition last commented upon, the meaning
of which is ambiguous.
Montana is a notice-race jurisdiction.5 82  The case of Guerin v.
Sunburst Oil & Gas Company,58 3 however, has no bearing whatever
upon the problem under discussion.
58 4
The twenty-eight cases, from thirteen states, cited in leading text-
books as supporting one view of our problem have now been indi-
vidually examined. Of decisions on the point there are only eleven,58 5
from seven jurisdictions; and of these decisions two can be so classified
only if one wishes to make the utmost possible concession to the view
under examination and to the writers citing the cases.58 6 In addition,
five other cases contain dicta which are in point and have not been
repudiated by later decisions; 58? two of these five being from juris-
58I. White v. Moffett, io8 Ark. 490, 496, 158 S. W. 505, 507 (1913).
582. MONT. Rzv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 6935.
583. 68 Mont. 365, 218 Pac. 949 (1923).
584. It decided that when A gave to B an option for the fee, in a recorded deed
that also contained a recital that the title was "subject to the Campbell lease," which
latter was unrecorded, and later A gave C an actual conveyance of the fee, B's recorded
deed gave constructive notice of the recital and therefore "notice of all material facts
which an inquiry suggested by that recital would have disclosed." 68 Mont. 365, 370,
218 Pac. 949, 95I (1923). The court had already said: "The trial court concluded
. . . that Mrs. Guerien 'purchased with constructive notice, at least, of the outstand-
ing rights in the defendant under such lease,' and it is the correctness of that con--
sion which is challenged by counsel for plaintiff.' Id. at 368, 218 Pac. 950. (Italics
supplied.) This seems to support what has been suggested above regarding recitals;
see p. 273 supra.
585. Those italicized on pp. 416-7 supra.
586. English v. Waples, commented upon at p. 418 supra; Erwi* v. Lewis, p. 422
supra.
587. County Bank of San Luis Obispo v. Fox, p. 42o supra; Fallass v. Pierce, p.
42o supra; Cook v. French, p. 424 supra; Parrish v. Mahany, p. 426 supra; White v.
McGregor, p. 429. The dictum and reasoning in Flynt v. Arnold, p. 418 supra, have
been repudiated in Massachusetts; note 489 supra.
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dictions in which direct decisions on the point have never been made.588
The total number of decisions and dicta is sixteen, from nine states.
Ignoring the distinction between decisions and dicta, in nine of
these sixteen cases there is either no statement whatever of the grounds
upon which the view expressed is rested, or, which amounts to the
same thing, none beyond an assertion that B's deed, being recorded,
gave constructive notice to any person subsequently purchasing.589
In the opinions of the remaining seven cases there is matter which may
be characterized as discussion. In one case, however, the dictum and
the reasons supporting it have been repudiated by later decision.5 90 In
two other cases it is only by considerable liberality that the courts'
remarks can be characterized as discussion of the point.591 Of the four
remaining cases, one by ipse dixit excludes any limitation upon record
search as unreasonable, and, aside from that, offers as reasoning re-
marks that are a pure petitio principii; 592 another reproduces that case
in both these respects; 593 and the two others reproduce and rely upon
its question-begging reasoning.594
Something better than this last could assuredly be expected from
every court. As respects the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a
search requirement, one should also be able to expect a serious con-
sideration of the general policy of the recording acts, and likewise some
reference to the actual practice of professional title searchers under the
system of recordation locally prevailing. Not a word on either of these
matters is to be found in a single one of the cases supporting this first
view of the problem under discussion. On the other hand, we have
seen that the authors of a work on the law of real property in New
York, where the view originated, have declared it to be "absurd," and
inconsistent with the invariable practice of title searching in that
state.59 5
CASES SUPPORTING THE SECOND VIEW
The following cases have been cited in standard textbooks as
contra to those just considered: 59" Massachusetts: Connecticut v.
588. Those in Cook v. French, p. 424 supra, and in Parrish v. Mahany, p. 426 supra.
589. Namely, referring to the cases listed on pp. 416-7 stpra (and ignoring the
twelve cases that are no wise in point) ; the three New York cases italicized; the Iowa
case italicized; the Illinois case italicized; the three California cases (dictum in the
third) ; the first Michigan case (dictum) ; the third Texas case (dictum).
59o. Flynt v. Arnold, note 587 supra.
591. White v. McGregor, p. 429; Delay v. Truitt, p. 429 and note 568 supra.
592. Fallass v. Pierce, see text at notecalls 131, 445 and p. 178 supra.
593. Woods v. Garnett, p. 426 supra.
594. Erwin v. Lewis, p. 422 supra; Parrish v. Mahany, p. 427 supra.
595. See p. 415 supra.
596. Namely by the authorities cited in note 455 supra.
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Bradish (1817),597 Trull v. Bigelow (I82O), 5 9 8 Somes v. Brewer
(1824),5 99 Glidden v. Hunt (1836), 600 Morse v. Curtis (1885) ; 6o0
Vermont: Day v. Clark (1853); 602 Wisconsin: Ely v. Wilcox
(1866) ;03 Montana: Mullins v. Butte Hardware Co. (19Ol); 604
Connecticut: Wheeler v. Young (19o3); 005 Virginia: Bowman v.
Holland (1914) ; 606 Texas: Delay v. Truitt (1916).607
Massachusetts is a pure-notice jurisdiction.60 8  There is nothing
relevant to our problem in the Somes case.609 The other three cases
cited are all in point and rest squarely on the propositions that B's
deed is outside D's title chain, that it would be contrary to "the spirit"
of the recording system and unreasonable to require him to search for
it, and that therefore it gives him no record notice. The opinion, to
this effect in the earliest Massachusetts case cited, the Bradish case, has
already been quoted.61 0 In the Trull case the court very properly
emphasized the negligence of the non-recording first grantee as the
cause of all the difficulty, justifying his subordination to any subsequent
purchaser "deriving his title from him who, in the public registry,
appears to be the lawful owner. ." 611
References to D's ignorance of C's state of mind (a pertinent
matter if D is for other reasons not himself a purchaser in good faith,
but irrelevant to the question whether D is such) have been earlier
discussed at length. Confusion on this point would appear to lurk in
portions of the following passage from the opinion in the Trull case,
which as a whole, however, makes perfectly clear the true principle as
earlier stated.612
597. 14 Mass. -96 (1817).
598. x6 Mass. 4o6 (182o).
599. ig Mass. 184 (1824).
6oo. 41 Mass. 221 (1836).
6oi. 140 Mass. 112, 2 N. E. 929 (1885).
602. 25 Vt 397 (1853).
6o3. 20 Wis. 523 (1866).
604. 25 Mont. 525, 65 Pac. IOO4 (i9oI).
6o5. 76 Conn. 44, 55 AtI. 670 (903).
6W6. ii6 Va. 8o5, 83 S. E. 393 (1914).
6o7. 182 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. I916).
6o8. MAss. GEN. LAws (932), c. 183, § 4. The statute has long read "actual
notice," but in application this includes inquiry notice. See, for a convenient discussion
of cases up to 1875, CROCKER, NOTES ON THE GENERAL STATUTES OF MASSACHUSETTS
(2d ed. 1875) 176 et seq. See also PAToN, LAND TiTLES (938) § 9 nf. io, 102.
6og. 19 Mass. 184 (824). The action was by a grantor against the purchaser
from a grantee who had obtained title by fraud and without consideration. The record-
ing act was in no way involved. As no actual knowledge or inquiry notice of the fraud
was proved to have been had by the defendant, he was of course protected.
61o. See p. 412 mpra.
6ii. Trull v. Bigelow, 16 Mass. 405, 418 (1820). Cf. pp. 151, 182-4 mspra. In fact,
C's immediate grantee, Judd, took title as a bona fide purchaser under this view; and
then the latter's grantee (Trull), though he himself had knowledge of B's deed (Bige-
low being B's grantee), was saved by Judd's bona fides.
612. See pp. 396, 402 et seq. supra.
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"It has been repeatedly decided, and is well known as a rule
of law, that a second purchaser shall not set up a title under a
registered deed, against the first purchaser [B], whose deed was
not registered, if he had knowledge of the prior conveyance ...
But [D], when he purchased of [C], did not know of the defect
in his [C's] title; or that there was anything in the conduct of
his [D's] 613 grantor tending to impeach his [C's] conveyance
[from A]. . . He [D] held the estate, then, under his con-
veyance from [C], purged of the fraud, which vitiated it in the
hands of [C]. . . . This principle is just; for the honest as-
signee [D] finds a good subsisting title on record in his grantor
[C], pays him the value of the land, and is wholly ignorant of
any circumstances which contradict the apparent fairness of the
title. In such case, the negligence of the first purchaser [B, who
did not record] is the cause of the difficulty; and although he shall
not suffer, when his negligence is fraudulently taken advantage
of by a subsequent purchaser [who has knowledge of it], yet when
a third party claims the land, deriving his title from him who, in
the public registry, appears to be the lawful owner, negligence
ought to turn the scale against the party who was guilty of it." 614
Although we have seen that in various more modern opinions the point
has caused continuing confusion,6 15 it has been kept entirely clear in
the Massachusetts cases.
616
The Glidden case, without discussion, merely followed the earlier
decisions. Chief Justice Shaw, however, in his dicta in Flynt v.
Arnold 61- discussed the problem at some length, although ignoring
the reasons given in the Bradish case, and likewise ignoring the rea-
son emphasized in the Trull opinion, above quoted. 618  The Chief Jus-
tice did clearly recognize that the limit of reasonable search is the limit
to which record notice should be confined,619 and to that extent his
remarks had merit. His assumption that search for earlier deeds of
the type here in question is reasonable was repudiated, and the rea-
soning of the earlier cases approved, in the Morse case, in a passage
already quoted, as better adjusted to "the spirit of our registry laws
and the practice of the profession under them." 620
613. "His" might be read as "D's" or "C's" (and therefore the next "his" as "C's"
or "A's"). On the fraud of any subsequent purchaser in taking advantage of A's
fraud, see pp. 142-5, 149-150 supra.
614. Trull v. Bigelow, x6 Mass. *4o6, *418-9 (182o).
615. See pp. 423, 426-8 mupra.
616. So, in the latest case, Morse v. Curtis, 140 Mass. 112, I14, 2 N. E. 929, 931
(1885) the court remarked of the wording of the local statute (note 6o8 supra) : "The
reason why the statute requires actual notice to a second purchaser, in order to defeat
his title is apparent: its purpose is that his title shall not prevail against the prior deed,
if he has been guilty of a fraud upon the first grantee; and he could not be guilty of
such fraud, unless he had actual knowledge of the first deed."
617. 43 Mass. 61g (1841).
618. Ibid.
61g. See p. 412 supra.
620. See p. 408 supra.
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Vermont is a pure-notice jurisdiction.621  Day v. Clark 622 has
been fully discussed earlier. 623  Even if understood as by the writer it
amounts to no more than an implied dictum on the problem before us;
and even if there be. an implied dictum that B's deed gives no notice
to D, there is no statement that this is because it is outside D's chain
of title, nor any other reason to support it. If otherwise understood
it has no pertinence whatever to our problem.
Wisconsin is a notice-race jurisdiction. 624  It is somewhat diffi-
cult to evaluate Ely v. Wilcox. 25  Its facts were unusual and inter-
esting. A preemptioner, A, assigned his interest to B (Ely) by a
deed which, being improperly acknowledged, was unauthorizedly re-
corded, and B gave back a purchase money mortgage of which the
same was true. After B had made conveyances of his equitable title
in various portions of the land, A received legal title from the govern-
ment and then conveyed to C, who recorded his deed but "knew of
the rights" of B when he purchased. A then executed a satisfaction
of B's mortgage and gave him a second deed that was recorded; and
thereafter C conveyed to D (Wilcox). When B brought a bill to
have title quieted, praying annulment of the A-C and C-D deeds, a
judgment given below for B was reversed.
Now, if both the recording of the first two deeds and B's rights
outside the record be ignored, C would have taken and recorded his
deed first, would have perfect title, and could pass such to D, regard-
less of any notice to D. But the court did not so reason. It assumed
that C could not have priority, because he had knowledge of B's unre-
corded rights; and Chief Justice Dixon, in his elaborate discussion of
the Ely case in Fallass v. Pierce 0 26 did likewise. 627  Both dealt with
D's rights as a question exclusively of notice.
As respects D, the court correctly held that the unauthorizedly
recorded deeds could give him no constructive notice,
2' and it was
not shown that he had information which put him upon inquiry re-
621. Vt. Pub. L. 2596
622. 25 Vt. 397 (853).
623. See pp. 405-7 supra.
624. See note 509 supra.
625. 26 Wis. 523 (i866).
626. 3o Wis. 443 (872).
627. "Nathaniel Green Wilcox [C] had knowledge of such previous deed to Ely,
at the time he took his conveyance." Id. at 465. But he also said: "Looking at the
registry . . . the title of Ely had accrued and was held by a deed junior in time and
junior in record to the deed to (Nathaniel Green] Wilcox, which, both by the common
law and by the statute, made the title of Wilcox the superior and only true and real
title." Id. at 467. This was meant only as a matter of the record alone, as seen by D.
628. See p. 176 suPra.
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garding them. 29  What, then, of record notice by B's second deed?
The cases, already discussed, which take the majority view of the
problem here under discussion hold that a deed by A to B -prior to that
from A to C, a fraudulent grantee who records first, gives constructive
notice, after its recording, to a purchaser thereafter from C. In the
instant case B's second deed was both taken and recorded after C's.
The court expressed a preference, which was dictum, for the Massachu-
setts view over the New York view of the former situation (that of our
problem), and then refused to apply the New York rule in the case
actually before it.630
The case therefore contains nothing but a dictum on our problem,
one favorable to the Massachusetts view. And as already pointed out,
all of Chief Justice Dixon's comments upon it in the Fallass case were
likewise merely dicta to the contrary effect. 631  Although it has been
stated by courts and textwriters that the Ely case was "overruled" by
the Fallass case, the truth is that the opinion in the latter case ex-
plicitly approved it. 2  The dispute was not as to the decision, but
629. B charged D with "knowledge of plaintiff's purchase, payment, deed, mort-
gage, possession," but D pleaded good faith. Ely v. Wilcox, 20 Wis. 523, 525 (1866).
The court held that "the evidence sustained the plea, unless there was constructive
notice to the appellant [D] of the respondent's [B's] title." Id. at 528. A's wife had
also given B a quitclaim that was properly recorded, but which did not indicate her
relationship to A. Of this the court said: "If the appellant had had actual notice of
this deed, it is doubtful whether it would have been sufficient to have put him upon in-
quiry. But constructive notice could only affect him with notice . . . at most of the
contingent right of dower of Ann Matson, which is not the title in dispute-certainly
not a sufficient title to enable the plaintiff to maintain this bill." Id. at 529. Cf. pp.
280-1 supra. The court also said that "it is held in New York that the record of a
prior deed, though not recorded till after the second deed and before the conveyance by
the vendee in the second deed, is notice to a purchaser from him, not only of the first
deed, but such notice that he is bound to inquire whether the grantee in the second
deed was a bona fide purchaser. . . . It is difficult to see any good reason for car-
rying the doctrine of constructive notice to that extent, and holding that constructive
notice only is sufficient to put a vendee uponlinquiry." Id. at 530. On this confusion,
see p. 402 et seq. supra.
630. Id. at 53o. But the opinion proceeds: "If we should so hold, then any vendor
of land might, after he had conveyed to a bona fide purchaser, put on record a dozen
deeds of the same land to different purchasers, and each of these would be a cloud upon
the title." Id. at 530-I. Now, the supposed bona fide purchaser (no prior conveyance
being mentioned) has true title. Assume (I) that he records it. Then his title cannot
be divested; the later deeds are nullities; as such, they should not be held to give rec-
ord notice (see pp. 168-171, 177, 278-281 supra) ; they could desirably be struck from
the record (p. 279 supra) as clouds. See pp. 279-280 and n. 276 supra. The court's
statement is true, but it has no necessary connection with notice. The manifest assump-
tion is based upon the idea that a nullity can give notice. Assume (,) that the bona
fide purchaser in question does not record. Then the taker of the first subsequent deed,
if he has no knowledge or inquiry notice of the earlier deed and (in Wisconsin) rec-
ords first, will have perfect and indefeasible title.
631. See p. 42o et seq. supra.
632. See especially Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 471 (1872) : "The case was
rightly decided;" also at 467: "if that was so, then . . . the question was rightly
decided." Chief Justice Dixon's two opinions in Fallas v. Pierce filled more than
twenty-five pages. Of these he devoted well over half -to a discussion of Ely v. Wil-
cox, decided when he was a non-dissenting member of the court. He insisted that what
was said in the opinion of that case (written, he remarked, "as by the court" by judge
Downer, who was counsel for the successful party in Fallass v. Pierce, at 455) on the
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merely as to one dictum in the opinion. The decision in Erwin v.
Lewis, 33 does not nullify the dictum in the Ely case; for, as already
seen, it is impossible to say that the decision in that case was upon
the issue of record notice.634  For this reason, dictum in the present
case simply stands opposed to dictum in the Fallass case.
There is, however, another aspect of the Ely case which deserves
emphasis because of its bearing upon the point that the courts should
recognize and emphasize the recording policy of favoring the subse-
quent purchaser, alike as regards record and inquiry notice.
The facts in the case involved a puzzle. Taking into account B's
actually prior deed, C was a subsequent purchaser who first properly
recorded, but who, because of his knowledge of B's (legally) unre-
corded deed, could not prevail over B. Did B, then, prevail over C?
Not, of course, under -the recording acts, for he was a prior non-
recording purchaser, and the acts provide only for the divestment of
such. Neither B nor C, then, could claim priority over the other under
the recording acts. But recourse is had, in applying those acts, to
knowledge of B's unrecorded deed in order to preclude good faith in C.
Might not one then also say that when B got and properly recorded
his second deed this should "operate back upon the title conveyed by
the first, in the nature of a further assurance"? 634a In that case, B
would get title as against C, being first purchaser and (in Wiscbnsin,
a notice-race jurisdiction, fiction overriding fact) first recorder. This
reasoning could certainly be regarded as not inequitable against C, who
had knowledge of B's prior rights. In that case there would again be
no place for the discussion of D's rights. He could get none from C.
The court, however, did not follow such reasoning.
The object of the recording acts, as Chief Justice Dixon remarked
in discussing the above problem, is "to protect the subsequent purchaser
in good faith for value at the expense of the prior one. . . . Such be-
ing the purpose of the statute, it may be that the character and capacity
of Ely as a prior purchaser, even in good faith for value, under a deed
not recorded, and which in form as acknowledged, never could have
been, ought not to have been taken into consideration in determining
the question." 035 But he went further in the following:
problem under discussion, "must be regarded as an expression of the views of the judge
who wrote the opinion, and not as a point in decision or question ruled in any matter
determined by the court." Id. at 455. Naturally, Judge Downer was irritated by
Dixon's elaborate attempts to explain the earlier decision. His wholly justifiable re-
tort on the issue of dictum has been quoted above, p. 421 supra.
633. 32 Wis. 276 (1873).
634. See p. 422 supra.
634a. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 466 (i872).
635. Ibid. And to same effect, id. at 467.
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"Such being the information, conveyed by the record, to the
purchaser [D] from [C], that [C] had the title and that
[B] had none, either by the common law or by the statute, it
would seem to follow that the purchaser might pass by [B's] deed
and the registry of it, and treat them as so much waste paper,
which gave [B] no interest in or claim whatever to 'the land.
And . . it would seem likewise to follow that the purchaser
from [C] was under no obligation to . . .make any inquiry as
to what right . . . [B] might by possibility have been supposed
to claim under his deed. If the views here suggested are correct,
and I must say I do not now see wherein they are not, then they
are the key which unlocks the mystery of Ely v. Wilcox . ,, 03
These arguments sustain views that have been emphasized throughout
the present article.
6A37
Montana is a notice-race state.63 However, there is nothing
whatever pertinent to our problem in Mullins v. Butte Hardware
Co.6
39
Connecticut is a notice jurisdiction. 640 However, there is again
nothing relevant to our problem in the cited case, Wheeler v. Young.
0 4
1
Virginia is a pure-notice jurisdiction. 642  The facts in Bowman v.
Holland 64 were perhaps those of our standard case, but involving
merely easements. A, owning IOI acres of land, granted 3o acres to
B (Holland) with an easement over the remaining portion, then
granted C an ostensibly unincumbered title to 21 acres, and the latter
deed was first recorded. Before C conveyed to D (Bowman), A had
conveyed to X another 5o acres with an easement identical with that
given B, X had conveyed to Y (Pentecost), and both these deeds were
recorded. A bill was brought by B and Y for an injunction restrain-
ing interference by D with their alleged easement. But the court,
merely reciting the recording dates, without discussion or citation of
636. Id. at 468. See also id. at 47o-i.
637. See pp. 175-6, 281-296 supra.
638. See note 582 supra.
639. 25 Mont. 525, 65 Pac. 1004 (I9OI). The problem involved was not one of
record notice, but of inquiry notice by possession of the land. The record showed title
to a mine to be in co-tenants, without reference to distinct surface rights. The ques-
tion was whether a certain surface occupation gave notice of a hostile claim incon-
sistent with the record title.
640. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5010. Cf. pp. 282-3 supra.
641. 76 Conn. 44, 55 Atl. 670 (1903). The case turned upon the question of title
by estoppel. A conveyed by warranty deed, before he held title, to X. The court re-
fused to apply the doctrine of title by estoppel. See pp. 185-6 stpra. The other con-
veyances were: deed by A to B (Burr) ; assignment by B to X (Wheeler) ; deed by
X (A. Young, holder of estoppel deed, first recorded) to defendant (H. Young).
Wheeler's title would be good when title in X by estoppel was excluded. If estoppel
had operated the case would have been (in the usual lettering of our problem) : deed
A to B (A. Young), first taken and first recorded; A to C (Burr), C to D (Wheeler)
-these last two manifestly void; B to E (H. Young, the defendant, who would have
had good title).
642. PA-rON, LAND TiTLEs (1938) § 96 n. 105.
643. 116 Va. 805, 83 S. E. 393 (1914).
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authority, said: "It is apparent, therefore, that Bowman took his
land unaffected by the subsequent recordation of the deeds to Holland
and Pentecost." 644 Neither actual knowledge nor inquiry notice of
B's rights by D was proved; and C's state of mind was treated as imma-
terial, without decision. The case is a direct holding that D can rely
upon the recorded title as of the time when he takes his conveyance.
Texas is a pure-notice jurisdiction.34" But it has already been
seen that Delay v. Truitt 040 supports not the present view, but the
first and contrary view, of our problem.
647
The result is, that the solution of that problem urged by the
writer, and supported by the cases just reviewed, is supported by five
decisions in two jurisdictions; 048 by a dictum in a third jurisdiction
which, at best, is only implied in the court's holding and is unsup-
ported by reasoning; 649 and by a dictum in a fourth jurisdiction, cit-
ing the Massachusetts cases, which is opposed to another dictum in
the same jurisdiction (supported by specious reasoning) °0 On the
other hand, we have found that the contrary view is supported by
eleven decisions in seven (of clear decisions, by nine in five) jurisdic-
tions, in addition to two dicta from other jurisdictions.""-
While this authority adverse to the view urged by the writer
scarcely deserves Mr. Pomeroy's characterization of it as "overwhelm-
ing," 652 since only nine states (at the most) are committed to one or
the other view, it would certainly be convincing if the reasons sup-
porting the majority decisions or dicta cotlld be accepted. We have
seen, however, that only a very few cases contain anything which
could, with the utmost liberality, be regarded as discussion of the prob-
lem, and absolutely no acceptable reason has been advanced in support
of the first viewY.3 That view deprives the phrase "chain of title"
of all meaning; 654 in theory it compels every purchaser to search the
records up to the moment of his search for deeds ever given by any
record holder of the titleO 5 The cases which adopt it either ignore
644. Id. at 8og, 83 S. E. at 394.
645. See note 564 supra.
646. 182 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
647. See p. 429 supra.
648. Four in Massachusetts, one in Virginia-those italicized in the list on pp.
432-3 supra.
649. That in Day v. Clark (Vt.), see p. 405 supra.
65o. That in Ely v. Wilcox, p. 435 et seq. supra, opposed to that in Fallass v.
Pierce, p. 421 supra.
651. See pp. 431-2 supra and notes thereto.
652. See p. 4o8 supra.
653. See text at notecalls 589-594 supra and notes thereto.
654. See p. 393 supra.
655. See pp. 393-4 et seq. supra.
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those facts or brush aside as irrelevant all considerations of the burden
thus put upon purchasers; 656 and they do this despite the fact that
(except in tract-recording states) even professional title searchers have
probably never anywhere made such a search as the rule theoretically
requires.6 57 The view is therefore open to the greater, because basic,
objection that it makes that law which is contrary to professional un-
derstanding and instinct. It is also open to the objection that it flouts
the policy of favoring the subsequent purchaser that underlies the re-
cording acts.
Not one of these criticisms applies to the minority authorities, ex-
cept that discussion is confined to the Massachusetts cases. But there it
has from the beginning been both ample and clear, and the reasons just
stated resulted, after long consideration, in the repudiation of the opin-
ion, favorable to the majority view, of so great a judge as Chief Jus-
tice Shaw.""" The second view, moreover, received the definite ap-
proval, as has been noted, of Judge Hare and Mr. Wallace, and of
Judge Leonard Jones65 9
656. See pp. 412, 426 supra.
657. See pp. 413, 426 supra.
658. See pp. 412, 434 supra.
659. See p. 407 supra.
